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I. INTRODUCTION
The exercise of discretion is at the heart of the institutional and
social function known as judgment. Judges doubtless spend most of
their time applying well-established law to disputed circumstances of
fact, but while there is judgment and discernment involved in such
endeavors, such activities do not involve the articulation of new legal
norms. Where judging excites the imagination, pricks the conscience
and excites passions of all varieties, is in the rarer cases where real
law is made, new precedents set, and new rules established where
before different ones-or none-clearly existed. This is the exercise
of judicial discretion. Not surprisingly, its exercise remains deeply
controversial.
American legal history, particularly with respect to the develop-
ment of American constitutional theory, has long suggested a close
nexus between a legal system's approach to the exercise of such
discretion and the fundamental notions of legitimacy that underlie
that system.' Nor is this dynamic unique to American jurisprudence;
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1. The great debates earlier in this century between legal "Realists" and adherents to the
more traditional "Formalist" school, for example, developed this theme considerably. Since the
1880s, Formalists had claimed that some almost Platonic ideal of law existed and could be
understood by careful study of seminal cases. See generally A. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 42-68 (1974). By the 1920s and 1930s, however, Realist scholars preached "the
relatively subordinate importance of rules," JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
283-84 (1935), and advocated that "the creative action of the judge," be used to advance the
goals of wise social policy unhindered by the constraints of traditional doctrine. BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 125 (1924). As shall be seen, American constitutional
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rather, it has characterized-even convulsed-many of the world's
most highly-developed legal regimes.2 Indeed, tension between
judges' creative function and the doctrinal legitimacy of legal rules is
a characteristic of any legal system in which norms generally rely for
their legitimacy upon institutions or processes that lie outside the
conference chamber of its highest court.3 For unless we are to
pretend that judges may have no creative and-interpretive role, it will
be necessary to find boundaries within which somehow to confine the
exercise of that discretion, lest in overreaching it rob the law of the
legitimacy acquired from its origination in those extra-judicial
institutions or processes.
Discussions of the uses of judicial discretion have hitherto largely
been confined to debates about judicial self-assertiveness in domestic
jurisprudence. This Article, however, will attempt to draw lessons
from these discussions and apply them to the international jurispru-
dence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), by means of
examining the Court's approach to the derivation of "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" under Article
38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.4 The legitimacy-dilemma of judicial
discretion is no less acute in international law than in other fields of
law such as American constitutionalism. If the legitimacy of interna-
tional norms derives from something more than the mere agreement
of five judges in the Hague, we must ccnceptualize an approach to the
exercise of international judicial discretion that allows us to begin to
deal with these legitimacy-dilemmas, and we must develop an
understanding of judicial discretion that will allow judges wisely to use
it-and to limit it-when its employ is required.
theory is quite preoccupied by tensions between the need for flexible interpretation and the
danger that too long a drink from the cup of realism would lead to the conclusion that even
constitutional law need be no more deeply grounded than the momentary caprice of five
Justices.
2. French jurists, for example, have struggled since 1789 with the difficulties of balancing
the need for judicial discretion and the traditional refusal of French legal doctrine to admit its
legitimacy. See, eg., Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L
L. 81, 92 (1994). Further afield, Muslim jurisprudence has struggled with similar tensions for
many centuries. See, e.g., NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE 3-19 (1969).
3. Such extra-judicial sources might include statutes enacted by an elected legislature,
written constitutions, the proclamations of an absolute monarch, or Divine revelation. In all
cases there is inevitably some tension when the judge-who is not a legislature, constitutional
convention, monarch or deity-attempts to fill gaps in the law or re-interpret rules through the
exercise of his own reasoning.
4. 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
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Part I of this Article briefly recounts different approaches to
these problems as they have been worked out in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Because American law derives its legitimacy
from a 200-year-old written constitution now required to provide the
foundational law for a society radically different from that in which
it was adopted, theorists of American constitutionalism have given
these legitimacy-dilemmas intense and sustained scrutiny for several
generations. The lessons of these great debates, I submit, can usefully
inform our attempt to develop a theory of international judicial
discretion. Specifically, since the international system lacks a written
constitution of the variety that makes judicial discretion so problemat-
ic in the American context, and since the Statute of the International
Court of Justice actually calls for the exercise of judicial discretion in
provisions such as Article 38(1)(c), I argue that the exercise of
international judicial discretion can learn much from what might be
called the "responsivist" approach to American constitutionalism.
Part II of this Article proceeds to outline this model of judicial
discretion as articulated by perhaps its foremost modem proponent,
Justice Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court. At root, Barak
attempts to deal with the legitimacy-tensions of judicial discretion by
advising jurists to "step outside themselves" in exercising such
discretion, attempting to decide with reference to the values of the
legal communities of which they are a part-rather than with
reference to the personal values of the judge himself. Despite
dramatic differences in both theory and context between international
and domestic legal regimes, I argue that models of judicial
norm-articulation that exhort such judicial deference to the values of
the "legal community" are particularly useful in the international
context-especially in the articulation of "general principles" under
Article 38(1)(c), an express textual warrant for gap-filling judicial
discretion.
Part III of this Article examines the history of jurists' attempts to
articulate a workable general principles doctrine under Article 38,
exploring what may be called rival "comparativist" and "categoricist"
approaches, and outlining the emergence of a doctrinal synthesis of
these two schools. This synthesis, I suggest, allows us to incorporate
some of the insights of the Barakian model of judicial discretion. I
then suggest that the structure of the International Court-with its
judges elected with specific concern to ensure that the various legal
"communities" of the world are represented on the international
1994]
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bench-makes it particularly well-adapted to applying Barak's
approach.
While domestic jurisprudence may struggle only inconclusively
with some of the questions to which Barak suggests that we find
answers if we are wisely to regulate the exercise of judicial discretion,
his model of judicial discretion is very useful in understanding judicial
discretion in the international context. General principles doctrine
under Article 38(1)(c) and the "constituency-representative" structure
of the International Court of Justice, in turn, represent the response
of international law to the legitimacy-dilemmas of judicial discretion
and to the challenges posed by the Barakian model. Properly
understood, therefore, they may help point the way to a manageable
and coherent approach to its exercise.
II. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Much of American constitutional legal theory is devoted to
debates over whether or not norm-articulation is a legitimate judicial
function. At the heart of such controversies is the dilemma of
constitutionalism, or what Alexander Bickel called the
"counter-majoritarian" difficulty:5 how is it that in a system of
democratic self-government, unelected (constitutional) judges have the
power to strike down the enactments of the duly-elected legisla-
ture-the voice of the majority of the population?6 International
jurisprudence has not traditionally faced this dilemma of course, since
its jurists are not in a position to exercise judicial discretion so as to
invalidate an international agreement for incongruity with some
foundational legitimizing text. As we shall see, however, the debates
over the uses and abuses of judicial discretion within constitutionalist
regimes may help inform our understanding of international judicial
discretion.
American constitutional thinkers have tried to escape the
Constitutional dilemma in various ways, but none with conspicuous
success. Writing more than a century ago, Christopher Tiedeman7
5. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
6. Akhil Amar argues that, in fact, elected branches often poorly reflect the genuine
popular will. See Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending The Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043,1080-85 (1988). For the sake of clarity, however, this paper
will assume, arguendo, that legislative enactments indeed reflect the wishes of majoritarian
self-government.
7. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITIEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1890). The account of American constitutional theory and theorists appearing in this
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unabashedly championed the idea that judges should use their
positions as expositors of constitutional law in order to keep the
foundational law in conformity with the "prevailing sense of right" of
the nation.8 Recognizing "the present will of the people as the living
source of law," he wrote, judges are "obliged, in construing the law,
to follow, and give effect to, the present intentions and meaning of
the people."9 This is quite a bold assertion, but it throws Tiedeman
into the teeth of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Were he to assert
that judges must invariably follow the present will of the people as
expressed by the political branches, he would indeed avoid
counter-majoritarianism, but at the cost of abandoning constitutional-
ism itself: the counter-majoritarian difficulty only bites where judicial
review enables the Court to nullify the popular (but unconstitutional)
enactments of the legislature. In still defending the idea that judges
can strike down laws for unconstitutionality, therefore, Tiedeman
could take refuge only in the claim that judges can discern the
difference between the people's "whim" and their genuine "will,"
striking down laws resulting from the former but affirming those
grounded in the latter."
Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, another
member of this "responsive" school," believed that a constitution
should function as a "living document" that changes with the times
"to cope with current problems and current needs."' 2  Justice
Brennan went even further than Tiedeman, rooting the legitimacy of
judicial review in the justices' responsibility to shape the future
national ethos, to "point toward a different path... [and] embody a
community, although perhaps not yet arrived, striving for human
section owes much to the guidance and suggestions of Prof. Jed Rubenfeld of the Yale Law
School. For a much more elaborate account and critique of these approaches, see Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. (forthcoming March 1995).
8. TIEDEMAN, supra note 7, at 149 (arguing that judge should "not enforce that shade of
meaning which was intended by the lawgiver, but [rather] that shade which best reflects the
prevalent sense of right").
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id. at 164 ("[Ihe popular will shall prevail ... but [not] ... their whims and
ill-considered wishes ... ").
11. The term "responsive" was coined by Robert Post. See Robert Post, Theories of
Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 19 (1990). Post follows Tiedeman and
Brennan in suggesting that judges should appeal to the prevailing "national ethos" in
adjudicating constitutional questions. See generally, id. at 23-26 (discussing the authority of
national ethos).
12. William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1985).
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dignity for all."" Again, however, this future-oriented view14
cannot escape Bickel's paradox of constitutional self-government:
even if the future will were knowable, what justification do judges
have to thwart that of the present?
Originalist theorists, who ground judicial review of the present
popular will in an appeal to some decisive sovereign consent of the
"people" in the past (namely, at the point of constitutional founding),
roundly criticize both Tiedeman's and Brennan's approaches on
counter-majoritarian grounds. Any departure from the meaning of
the constitution as understood at the time of its original ratification,
argue the originalists, is tyranny: the imposition of judges' personal
values upon the sovereign people.'5 For originalists such as U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, any efforts to make the Court
"speak ... for the[] constitutional ideals" of the nation represent a
frightening "Imperial Judiciary ... [a] Nietzschean vision of ...
judges-leading a Volk who will be 'tested by following." 16  In
reality, argue the originalists, the role of a constitutional court is to
enforce the sovereign will of the people as expressed in the ratified
constitution, while leaving everything not mentioned therein to
self-rule by the modem majority. 7 Present will matters not a whit
until the present people take it upon themselves formally to amend
the founding document.
13. liL at 444.
14. Robert Post also suggests such a fiture-directed role. There is, for Post, an ongoing
dialogue between bench and people: if the Court's "vision of national ethos" does not agree with
our own, for example, "our protests will create a reconstituted political perspective that will in
turn alter the character of future judicial appointments." Post, supra note 11, at 36. He thus
seems to suggest, as does Brennan more explicitly, that an American-style constitutional court
can, for its part, helpshape the "national ethos" of the future.
15. For originalists, the People enshrined their supreme will in the constitutional text, and
until this document should be formally amended, it must constrain the policy-activism of judges
in the same way it requires ordinary legislative acts not to cross the boundaries it sets up. See,
e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144-46, 252 (1990); RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2882 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
This criticism was directed, however, not solely at liberal "responsive" theorists like Brennan,
Tiedeman and Post, but also at Scalia's otherwise fairly conservative fellow justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, David Souter and Anthony Kennedy-who in their joint opinion in the Casey case
articulated a view of constitutional adjudication in which judges play a role analogous to that
of a common law court deciding whether or not to overrule ordinary precedents. Cf. Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2806-15 (opinion of O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, JJ.).
17. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803) (finding constitutional
authority in authorship by the People); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304,308
(Cir. Ct. D. Penn. 1795) (same).
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Yet originalists do not easily escape the counter-majoritarian
difficulty either. Indeed, their emphasis upon the importance of
majority self-government (which they aver is traduced by the judicial
imposition of value judgments) highlights Bickel's paradox, by
focusing our inquiry upon how the "plain meaning" of the constitution
can be enforced against the will of today's majority. Formal
amendment of the constitution is the sine qua non of originalist
constitutional change, yet-at least by its own terms' 8 -constitutional
amendment is difficult. According to the U.S. Constitution, amend-
ment requires an effective "supermajority": the concurrence of either
two-thirds of both houses of Congress or two-thirds of the state
legislatures is needed to propose amendments. Its ratification
requires agreement by the legislatures of-or popular referenda
in-three-quarters of the states.19 The constitutional choices of the
past do constrain present majority rule in vastly important ways: the
ratifiers of the Constitution are long dust: how can their "dead hand"
legitimately control people today?
The American debates among "originalists," "responsivists," and
their progeny' illustrate recurring problems with the theoretical
legitimacy of judicial review-and particularly judicial discretion in
norm-articulation-within the context of a written
constitutionalism.21 Though Bickel's dilemma is one peculiar to
18. Akhil Amar, though certainly no originalist, has argued forcefully that "We the People"
retain an inherent and inalienable right to amend (or abolish) the Constitution by simple
majority vote at any time. Article V of the U.S. Constitution, he contends, pertains only to
limiting the amendment-powers of the ordinary institutions of government created under the
aegis of constitutional authority, and does not (indeed, cannot) limit the people's inherent right'
to choose the mechanisms of its self-government. See generally Amar, supra note 6, at 1051-52.
19. U.S. CONST. art. V.
20. John Hart Ely has suggested an alternative approach, in which judicial activism is
justified to the extent that it "ensure[s] that the political process-which is where [substantive]
values are properly identified, weighed, and accommodated-[is] open to those of all viewpoints
on something approaching an equal basis." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74
(1980). This article will not further explore Ely's "process"-based approach to judicial
discretion, however, since its focus upon the need to ensure individual access to the political
process is presently of only arguable relevance to international jurisprudence.
21. American constitutional law, of course, pioneered this concept. Most famously, in the
early years of the American Republic, Chief Justice John Marshall struck down a Congressional
statute enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. The very idea of written constitutionalism, wrote Marshall, requires
that the Constitution be considered a law superior to the ordinary enactments of legislatures
constituted thereunder. "If ... [in the event of a conflict between a constitutional rule and an
ordinary law] the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case
to which they both apply." Id. at 177; see also Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.), at 308
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constitutional law, exchanges over the legitimacy of judicial review
form part of a broader jurisprudential dialogue over the role of
norm-creation through judicial discretion. Debates over the role of
judicial discretion, of course, are not confined to American constitu-
tional law. While the common law tradition tacitly accepts a judicial
role in the elaboration of sub-constitutional legal norms,' civil law
countries such as France, for example, often have difficulty with a
judge's creative role in the legal system. 3
Even absent a solution to the counter-majoritarian problem,
theories of judicial discretion may usefully inform our approach to
jurisprudential arenas outside that of formal written
constitutionalism-and in particular, international law. International
law conspicuously lacks a formal grounding document: within the
terms of the American constitutional debates, the state-consensualist
traditions of international jurisprudence may be said to be uniquely
rooted in the paradigm of "present popular will." International legal
doctrines such as that of peremptory law (jus cogens), for example,
strongly suggest a jurisprudential orientation toward what Robert Post
calls a "responsive" approach to foundational law24-an approach in
which founding norms are tied to the development of the "prevalent
sense of right."'  For such a system (in the international context),
there is no counter-majoritarian problem of the sort identified by
("Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act
of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.").
22. Even common law countries have often struggled over the propriety of a self-assertive
judicial role in law-creation, however, as early 20th-century debates between so-called "Legal
Realists" and "Positivists" amply illustrate.
23. Indeed, the leaders of the French Revolution once went so far as to forbid judges from
proclaiming general rules and to bar judicial review of legislation. Rather, it was decreed, judges
should refer to the legislature whenever questions of any real novelty arose. To this day, French
legal opinions-even ones that significantly change prior legal rules and powerfully affect
citizens' reliance interests-are remarkably opaque, as if by offering no reasons for rulings the
role of the willful jurist might be obscured and the mythology of mere application preserved.
See generally Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81,
92-108 (1994).
24. Post, supra note 11, at 23-26. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that treaties are void if they "conflicto with a peremptory norm of general international law,"
by which is meant a rule "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344. A norm of jus cogens,
therefore, binds all states irrespective of contrary practice until such point as the international
community "as a whole" agrees upon a supervening rule.
25. TIEDEMAN, supra note 7, at 7. Jus cogens jurisprudence is perhaps the closest thing to
domestic "constitutionalism" seen in the international arena.
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Bickel, as it is unambiguously the task of judges to ascertain the
values of the relevant "people" of today. Expressions of past popular
will (even constitutional expressions) do not constrain those of
today.26
The clearest indication of the entrenchment of international law
in responsivist foundational jurisprudence-and of its distance from
the counter-majoritarian paradoxes of written constitutionalism-is to
be found in the Statute of the International Court of Justice itself,
Article 38(1)(c), which seems expressly to authorize the international
bench to look to prevailing legal sensibilities as a source of law to
guide its adjudication of disputes. Article 38 reads as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.27
The reference to present custom as "evidence of general practice
accepted as law" clearly ties customary rules to an opinio juris likely
to be favored by Tiedeman. However, the key to the role of the
International Court itself articulating hitherto unexpressed interna-
26. International law has, however, a different theoretical difficulty: that of defining exactly
what is meant by this "people." Suspended, in some sense, between a "Grotian"
individual-human-rights paradigm and a "Vattelian" ideal of state-sovereignty, modem
international jurisprudence has some difficulty discerning its relevant constituent components.
See generally Paul W. Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in
Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
58-60 (1987). As we shall see, however, the International Court of Justice takes as its
value-constitutive starting point the various legal "communities" of the world's state-territorial
units.
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060,
3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
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tional legal norms lies in Article 38(1)(c), authorizing recourse to
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
While written constitutionalism presents the nagging legitimacy
problems of Bickel's counter-majoritarian dilemma, international
jurisprudence, a non-constitutional and expressly "present will"
oriented legal regime, provides an intriguing "test case" for the
applicability of theories of responsivist norm-articulating judicial
discretion. The general principles jurisprudence of the ICJ should be
examined in this light. The vehicle for this examination will be what
is perhaps the most comprehensive exposition of the responsive ideal
of judicial discretion yet produced: Israeli Supreme Court Justice
Aharon Barak's 1989 work Judicial Discretion.'
Although with respect to the exercise of discretion, international
jurists face structural and doctrinal constraints tremendously differ-
ent-and in many ways more formidable-than those encountered by
domestic judges, Barak's analysis applies with considerable force in
the international arena. Indeed, if there is anything to the strong
criticisms levelled at responsive jurisprudential constitutional scholar-
ship by originalist thinkers such as Justice Scalia or anything in the as
yet unanswerable legitimacy problems of the Bickelian dilemma, a
Barakian approach to judicial discretion-which owes much to
Tiedeman's ideal of following the "prevailing sense of right" and
partakes, also, of its weaknesses-might be more useful in the
international arena than in systems with written constitutions and
well-developed systems of judicial review.
A. The Barakian Model of Discretion
1. Discretion and the Challenge of the "Objectivity" Test. It
is the guiding assumption of Justice Barak's examination of the use of
judicial discretion that judges and courts occasionally find themselves
28. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989). Justice
Barak's basic arguments-that in occasional "hard cases" judges may be confronted with
situations for which established legal principles provide no answer and must in such
circumstances exercise their reason in order to create law-were themes emphasized as early as
1931 in U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo's Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School.
See B.N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165-67 (1931) (noting that in
some small percentage of cases there is no clear answer consistent with eitablished principles
of law, requiring a "balancing of judgment ... [and] testing and sorting of considerations of
analogy and logic and utility and fairness ... [by] the judge [as he] assumes the function of
lawgiver"). While these ideas have a long realist genealogy, however, Aaron Barak provides
their most systematic (and most modem) articulation.
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confronted with a "hard case." In some circumstances, in other
words, they will be presented with a situation in which "the judge is
faced with a number of [outcome] possibilities, all of which are lawful
within the context of the system."29 In "easy" and even "intermedi-
ate" cases, in Barak's characterization, well-accepted rules of law may
be applied such that, "[e]very lawyer who belongs to the legal
community... will come to [a particular] conclusion-that only one
lawful solution exists-such that if a judge were to decide otherwise,
the community's reaction would be that he was mistaken."3
Justice Barak maintains that judicial discretion exists precisely
because of "hard" cases.3 He defines discretion as "the power given
to a person with authority to choose between two or more alterna-
tives, when each of the alternatives is lawful." 32 Hard cases present
the decision-maker with two (or more) equally "legitimate" alterna-
tive holdings: no option can clearly be said to be the "right" answer
29. BARAK, supra note 28, at 40. Barak's analysis focuses almost exclusively upon the use
of judicial discretion in deciding matters of law-that is, in the choice of norms and their
application to a given set of facts-rather than in determining matters of fact. He admits that
in reality "[t]here exists... an intimate link between norm and fact" such that "[t]he norm sifts
through facts and focuses only on those that are relevant [and]... [t]he facts sort through the
norms and concentrate only on those that apply." I at 17. Judicial discretion, he writes, plays
a vital role in determining the facts presented in a particular case-in fact, this use of discretion
is "arguably the most important in the judicial process, since most disputes that are brought
before the courts concern only facts." I&a at 13. "Discretion" in the sense Barak uses the term,
becomes very problematic when used in the context of courts' determinations of fact.
[D]oes the judge have discretion in the sense in which we are using this term, that is,
can he choose between two or more lawful results? This is a difficult question, tied as
it is to philosophical and psychological debates about the nature of reality. Is there a
reality that the judge simply "finds" and "uncovers," or is there rather no objective
reality at all, and does the judge "invent" and determine the facts? If only one "real"
and "true" reality exists, does the judge have any discretion, or is he instead obligated
to choose that reality and to find it as fact for the purpose of deciding the conflict?
lei at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Barak, however, declines to wrestle with these questions,
confining his study to "judicial discretion in the normative plane, not in the factual plane." Id.
at 14.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Barak borrows the term "hard cases" from Ronald Dworkin, see RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977), with whom, on the subject of judicial discretion, Barak
strongly disagrees. See BARAK, supra note 28, at 28-33. Barak asserts that Dworkin is of the
opinion that every legal problem possesses a single lawful solution, so that even in "hard" cases
"the legal norm directs the judge, forcing him to choose one of the possibilities, and only that
one." Id. at 28. In Dworkin's view, therefore, there is no judicial discretion because it is
impossible for a judge to be presented with more than one legitimate alternative. According to
Barak's critique, Dworkin mistakes the existence of limits upon the exercise of judicial discretion
for the absence of such discretion. Id. at 33. Barak feels that discretion does exist, but that it
is not and cannot be absolute. See id. at 20-27. He argues that judges are limited to choices
between lawful outcomes and the means by which they may legitimately make their choice.
32. BARAK, supra note 28, at 7.
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under the law as understood up to that point in time. Such cases are
concededly quite rare,33 but they make possible-indeed, they
require-the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion, then,
is:
a legal condition in which the judge has the freedom to choose
among a number of options. Where judicial discretion exists, it is
as though the law were saying, "I have determined the contents of
the legal norm up to this point. From here on, it is for you, thejudge, to determine the contents of the legal norm, for I, the legal
system, am not unable to tell you which solution to choose." It is
as though the path of the law came to a junction, and the judge
must decide-with no clear path and precise standard to guide
him-which road to take?'
The heart of the answer to the question "How is a judge properly
to exercise judicial discretion?" is to be found in what Barak calls the
test of "objectivity." At root, a judge must exercise discretion so as
to reach the result he feels most faithful to the values of the legal
system as a whole, balancing the conflicting values presented and
formulating a new judicial policy by articulating a new norm.35
Though it is obviously the judge who must make this decision, it must
be made-insofar as possible-without reference to the judge's own
values. A judge must, Barak writes, make a deliberate transition from
his personal perspective as "the judge" to that of "the court," a
process which is intended to enable him to apply the standards of the
broader legal community of which he is a part.
When the judge is required to identify the values of society, he
looks for those values that are shared by the members of the
society, even if they are not his own. He avoids imposing on the
society his subjective values, to the extent that they are inconsistent
with the articles of faith of the society in which he lives.... When
the judge must balance various values according to their weight, he
33. See id. at 41-42; "Only a small part of all the decisions in a [legal] system are in the
sphere of hard cases, and only a small percentage of all the cases that are brought before the
various instances raise problems of judicial discretion." Id. at 42.
34. Id. at 8.
35. IE at 125. Barak consistently uses the masculine third-person singular to indicate an
unspecified individual; this convention will thus be followed herein in order to avoid confusion
in juxtaposing textual material and quoted matter.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
should strive to do so according to what seems to him to be the
society's fundamental conception. 36
Thus, "the judge must be capable of looking at himself from 'the
outside"'37 and of balancing values against each other in the way that
he believes is most faithful to the ideals of the legal community of
which he, as judge, is the authoritative representative.
In Barak's characterization, discretion exists "only when each of
the options open to ... [the judge] is permissible from the perspec-
tive of the system.' Despite the lack of a clear test for unlawful-
ness, Barak believes that there still exist "possibilities that every
knowledgeable lawyer can readily identify as lawful, and there are
other possible solutions that any lawyer would immediately under-
stand to be unlawful. Between these poles exist possibilities as to
which knowledgeable lawyers might disagree about the degree of their
lawfulness., 39  The test of lawfulness, then, is a test of the general
belief of "knowledgeable lawyers or the legal community."'  There
are at least four serious challenges to anyone seeking to apply Barak's
approach.
a. The Problem of Stepping Outside One's Self First, there
is the difficulty of actually achieving the personal perspective required.
Though legal systems often go to great lengths to protect judges from
external influences which might taint their objectivity,4' any judge's
ability to take a mental step "outside himself" is necessarily limited
in that he cannot, in any ultimate sense, really be anyone else.
36. Id. at 125-26.
37. Id. at 127.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 10-11.
40. Id. at 11. "Thus, we can say that judicial discretion exists where the legal community
believes a legal problem has more than one lawful solution." Id.
41. Most familiarly, the U.S. Constitution's Article III provides for great independence ofjudges from political pressures by giving them life tenure (subject only to extraordinary removal)
and salary protection. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."). In most legal systems, a complex ritual of evidentiary rules limits what a factfinder
may formally consider, while applications of norms to facts must be formally explained and
justified through the medium of the recorded opinion-for the preservation and retrieval of
which elaborate and extensive information-management institutions have been developed. In
all but the highest courts, formal written explanations of judicial reasoning are subjected to
appellate scrutiny; even supreme courts' decisions face something of a "judgment of history,"
as such bodies are at liberty to overrule their own precedent.
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Admitting that complete success is impossible, however, Barak still
feels there to be value in the attempt:
If the judge is not aware that judicial discretion exists, he will not
make any conscious effort to distinguish between his own
out-of-the-ordinary subjective feelings and the need to make an
objective decision. ... Awareness of the exercise of discretion puts
the judge on guard and makes it possible for him to cut himself off
from those subjective factors that he should not take into ac-
count.42
To fail to recognize the nature of the discretionary project would be
to invite far greater infidelity to the values which the judge should
apply-even to the point, as the American originalists most fear, of
a judge imposing his own substantive values upon the legal system.
b. The Problem of Identifying Cases Requiring Discretion.
Another challenge exists at the level of distinguishing those cases
which are genuinely hard cases. Mistaking an intermediate or easy
case for a hard one would presumably be an error of the first
magnitude: a judge would hazard, unnecessarily, all the pitfalls of
Barak's objectivity analysis, and could very easily reach a flatly
incorrect result. Mistaking a hard case for an easier one, on the other
hand, would be to decide a genuinely discretionary issue in simple
ignorance; such a result might or might not do justice in the instant
case, but could hardly, as precedent, provide a satisfactory articulation
of the new norm in fact created thereby.
"We do not possess an instrument that lets us distinguish in a
precise manner between a lawful possibility and an unlawful possibili-
ty." Barak argues that there still exists, in these categories, "a solid
nucleus of certainty ... [around which] rotates the entire structure,
with all its broad spectrum,"'43 but for a judge faced with a particular
case this is surely little consolation. Again, however, Barak's
42. BARAK, supra note 28, at 139.
43. 1& at 43. Between outcomes obviously lawful and obviously unlawful, Barak writes,
there exist
a number of situations about which the legal community is itself divided. These
scenarios should not be called unlawful, just as one cannot say about them that they
are lawful. Indeed, it is the judicial decision itself that will determine the lawfulness
of these possibilities... . Where the views of the legal community are divided, the
judge has discretion to determine whether or not judicial discretion exists.
Id. at 11. Thus, paradoxically, there is a degree of discretion in whether or not a particular case
requires the exercise of discretion.
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formulation is not useless, since it may still provide an important
means for judges to structure their approach to an issue-and,
through articulate self-awareness, to improve the quality of their legal
analysis.' While a Barakian judge might easily err, a judge unaware
that there might even be such things as hard cases would fall short
every time such a case arose.
c The Problem of Finding the "Fundamental" Conception. A
more daunting challenge is that of identifying the "fundamental
conception" of the legal community. Perhaps unconsciously echoing
Tiedeman's awkward claim that judges are able to distinguish between
the genuine popular "will," which a judge must obey, and transitory
popular "whim," which may be disregarded,45 Barak writes:
The objective tests force the judge to give expression to the
fundamental values of the society and not to its subjective values,
to the extent the two are different. The objective element does not
require the judge to give expression to the temporary and the
fleeting. He must give expression to the central and the basic.
Thus, when a given society is not faithful to itself, the objective test
does not mean the judge must give expression to the mood of the
hour. He must stand firm against this mood, while expressing the
basic values of the society in which he lives.'
How is this to be done? The sort of wisdom necessary for a judge to
"step outside" himself surely pales beside the necessity, here, of his
"stepping outside" the immediate currents of his entire legal culture
in order to identify some greater scheme embodying values perhaps
contradicting those presently held by many-or most, or
all-members of that community. In part because of the need to
distinguish ephemeral values from "fundamental" ones, a judge
seeking in good faith to follow Barak's guidelines cannot simply
"conduct a public opinion survey to ascertain the views of the legal
community. Each judge must make this decision for himself... [in
44. Barak understands the difficulty of asking unerring distinctions of judges, and writes that
"it is impossible to condition the lawfulness of a judge's ruling on the existence of awareness"
of the nature of the case (hard, intermediate, or easy) being decided. Id at 136-37. "[L]ack of
awareness does not invalidate the decision. But it seems to me that the lack of awareness must
affect the status of the decision in the normative realm. The normative weight of a new judicial
creation that was arrived at out of an awareness that it was a new creation differs from the
weight of this same creation if it was produced without any awareness." Id at 137.
45. TIEDEMAN, supra note 7, at 164.
46. BARAK, supra note 28, at 130.
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order to] give expression to what appears to him to be the basic
conception of the society (the community) in which he lives and
acts."'47 Particularly for a society in which the fundamental legal
values change and develop over time, this task cannot but be vastly
difficult.
This problem is at the root of the criticism leveled by Justice
Scalia and others at those who would have constitutional courts
"speak before all others for [the people's] constitutional ideals.""
In the Scalia/Bork view, "community" norm-articulation results in
nothing more than the imposition of judges' personal values49 upon
an unwilling sovereign people by an "Imperial Judiciary."5 Any
system seeking to invoke judicial discretion must be able to resolve
this difficulty, or at least to minimize the problems associated
therewith.
d. The Problem of Value Sub-Communities. Even assuming
the contours of the relevant legal community to be clearly discern-
ible,"1 in any society in which values in fact do change and develop
over time, a judge faces the possibility not simply that the values of
the moment might traduce more fundamental values, but also that his
community may lie somewhere along a continuum between one
fundamental vision and the next. This, Barak feels, demands
particular care from the judge:
The judge must not feed into his system values that have not yet
matured nor values that are the subject of bitter controversy. In
this way one can ensure that the values of the legal system
faithfully reflect the values of the society, and that only a mature
change of the values of the society produces a change in the legal
values. Thereby the coherence of the legal system will be guaran-
teed, for new values that are channeled into the legal system have
a way of being formulated slowly, through reciprocal relations and
strong connections with the values that already exist in the system.52
47. I at 12.
48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Souter and Kennedy, I.).
49. BoRK, supra note 15, at 251-52 ("At some point, every theory not based on the original
understanding [of the constitutional Framers] ... requires the judge to make a major moral
decision.").
50. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2882 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
51. See infra part II.D.2.
52. BARAK, supra note 28, at 159.
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Perhaps more problematically, the legal community might in fact
be divided between fundamental visions, or on certain issues no such
fundamental value could be said to have coalesced. Could, for
example, the American legal community-divided as it is between
originalists and responsivists-be said to have a single grounding
approach to constitutional interpretation, which might inform a
judge's approach to the application of an especially problematic
provision in a particular case?
This problem of value-heterogeneity is critical, as it suggests that
for certain issues the "legal community" that the judge must represent
may in fact be made up of multiple communities-each with a
fundamental vision too inconsistent with its rivals to permit harmoni-
zation but too consistently held to constitute an ephemeral departure
from some prior fundamental conception. And yet, at least in the
domestic context,53 judges have no alternative but to decide the case
presented to them.
Robert Post tried to deal with this problem by hypothesizing that
a judge's appeal to the "national ethos" might reveal different
answers on different questions. Thus, for him, while the underlying
dynamic remains tied to Barak's appeal to community values, the
community might demand that different interpretive methods be used
for different substantive issues. A court, he wrote:
can justifiably use ... [originalist] interpretation with respect to an
issue in a case if it believes that the national ethos supports an
identification with a past act of consent relative to that issue. But
it can justifiably use responsive interpretation if it can discern with
respect to that issue the presence of a national ethos that in a
pertinent way historically embodies the essential content and spirit
of the Constitution, and that precludes identification with any past
act of consent. Hence the choice between historical and responsive
interpretation can turn on an appraisal of the national ethos.s
This fails to answer the question fully, however, since it presumes
that a "national ethos" will be unambiguously identifiable with respect
even to a particular substantive claim. Can it really be said with
certainty that Americans as a "legal community" endorse either an
"originalist" or a "responsivist" interpretive method with respect to
53. The possibility of non liquet outcomes in the international context will be discussed
herein. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92. No commentator, to my knowledge, has yet
suggested that modern domestic jurisprudence permit non liqueL
54. Post, supra note 11, at 35.
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the Equal Protection Clause55 of the U.S. Constitution? Justice
Brennan, as we have seen, tried to escape the problem of divided
value-communities by claiming the right to "point toward a different
path" and help forge a new value-consensus on a particular issue.
6
But if the "true" national "ethos" of the present is difficult to discern,
how much more so must be that of the future?
For Barak, all of these problems make the judge's task much
more difficult, but far from futile. They are challenges to the wise
judge, he seems to suggest, but they should not be taken as reasons
for despair. While few judges might be able to achieve the objectivity
for which Barak calls, there remains considerable value in asking all
to try-and to be aware of the responsibilities of their task. This,
again, is the heuristic value of the model: as an ideal to which it is
posited that judgment should aspire, it encourages the decision-maker
explicitly to consider the various factors that go into the use of
judicial discretion. A judge, writes Barak,
must be aware of the fundamental problems that lie at the basis of
the exercise of judicial discretion. He must be aware of the funda-
mental normative problems. Thus, for example, he must under-
stand that a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion requires
consideration not only of the existing fundamental values, but also
of new values. He must be conscious of the need for organic
growth. He must be aware that he fills a dual role of deciding the
particular conflict before him and establishing a general norm, and
that between these two tasks there is constant tension. He must
recognize the need to ensure consistency and neutrality, while
showing special understanding for the problem of retroactivity. At
the same time, he must be aware of the institutional problems that
lie at the foundation of judicial discretion and of the incidentality
of the exercise thereof. He must understand that in the exercise of
discretion he is limited in information and in means. He must
realize that he must do justice and that justice must also appear to
have been done. For this, he must act objectively. In addition to
all these requirements, he must be aware of the place of the judge
in the system of separation of powers. He must be cognizant of the
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
56. Brennan, supra note 12, at 444. Justice Brennan referred here to his opposition to
capital punishment, despite the fact that his view of the death penalty "is an interpretation to
which a majority of my fellow Justices-not to mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow
countrymen-does not subscribe." Id.
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problem of democracy and of the society's conception of the
judicial role. He must also take into account the relations among
the various governmental authorities.
Such broad awareness imposes a difficult burden upon the
judge.'
Even if the resulting analysis is flawed in important ways, Barak
assumes that these judicial values will be better served by a judge's
awareness of the nature of the undertaking-and the explicit
articulation of his resulting reasoning-than they would were hard
cases to be decided in ways opaque even to the judge himself. Thus
Barak asks three kinds of awareness of the legal decision-maker: (1)
awareness of the existence of judicial discretion; (2) awareness of
what it means to use judicial discretion; and (3) awareness of the need
to formulate the purpose behind a legal norm created through judicial
discretion. 8
2. Domestic vs. International Judicial Discretion. Barak's
analysis focuses upon the use of discretion by judges in a domestic
legal system, applying statutory and precedential caselaw to the
problem at hand in the context of a well-developed system of law
enforcement the functions of which are generally accepted as
legitimate by the community within which they operate. International
jurists, however, face rather different circumstances, both structurally
and politically.
The most fundamental difference between the situations in which
domestic and international jurists find themselves is in the power the
system allows them with which to give force to their judgments.
Domestic tribunals have an enormous advantage here, as they are
able to rely upon the coercive monopoly of the state for the enforce-
ment of the law as pronounced by the courts. In criminal proceed-
ings, for example-a category of law virtually nonexistent in interna-
tional jurisprudence5 --marshals or sergeants-at-arms physically
compel the presence of the defendant, and should adjudication result
in conviction, the state can call upon a small army of probation
officers, guards, correctional institutions, and even executioners to
ensure that the sentence is carried out. Civil proceedings are backed
57. BARAK, supra note 28, at 14647.
58. Id at 138.
59. See generally Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRrr. Y.B. IN'L L. 178,
205-11 (1946).
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by a government-enforced power of forfeiture and contempt,
regulatory law may be enforced by civil or criminal penalties,' and
even the pronouncements of constitutional law can be backed by the
coercive power of the state-up to and including the use of military
force to ensure obedience to the law of the land.61
Though positivist theories long insisted that judges could or
should not engage in "law creation,"'62 it is also widely accepted in
most domestic jurisdictions that judges indeed do play a role in
developing jurisprudence.' Where gaps should be found to exist in
the settled law, it is considered the responsibility of the court to fill
them. During the great efforts to codify domestic law in 19th-century
Europe, much debate occurred over how judges were to deal with
lacunae in the law presented by a particular case. Today many
domestic jurisdictions expressly provide for such gap-filling.' As
Barak notes,' for example, Swiss law provides that the judge is to
provide law to cover such an eventuality as if he were the legisla-
ture,' while Austrian law authorizes recourse to the "natural
principles of justice,"'67 and Italian and Mexican law suggest turning
to the general principles of the legal order of the state.' Such
60. Some U.S. food-safety laws, for example, provide not only for administrative fines but
for criminal penalties for their violation. See, eg., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
(affirming criminal conviction of corporate official for company's violation of laws requiring
sanitary food storage).
61. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), for
example, President Dwight Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard in order to
compel recalcitrant state officials to integrate public schooling there.
62. See generally, Frank, supra note 1, at 49.
63. Even in countries such as France, which prize a terse and opaque form of legal opinion
and in which judges have traditionally disowned any role in "creating" law through precedent,
judge-made law is of cardinal importance. French administrative law, for example, has been
fashioned "out of whole cloth" by the courts. See Wells, supra note 23.
64. International law attempts to deal with this problem by authorizing the I.CJ. to invoke
"general principles" under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Court. By the time the Statute
of the P.C.I.J. was drawn up in 1920, the national legal systems of three of the ten members of
the Committee of Jurists which drafted it had adopted a "general principles of law" formulation
to deal with this challenge. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRBUNALS 18-19 (1987).
65. BARAK, supra note 28, at 88-89.
66. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH art. 1, § 2 (Switz.), CODE CIVIL SUISSE art. 1, §
2 (Switz.), CODICE CIVILE SVIZZERO art. 1, § 2 (Switz.).
67. ALLOEMEINES BORGERLICHES GEsETBUCH art. 7 (Aus.).
68. CODICE CIVILE art. 12 (Italy); C6DIGO CIVIL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL § 19 (Mex.).
Section 370a of the Mexican Code also refers to such "general principles." See BARAK, supra
note 28, at 88.
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formal gap-filling provisions are not at all uncommon.69 In common
law jurisdictions, of course, the law-creating role of the courts is well
understood. It is possible, for example, for courts to find "implied"
private rights of action in statutory law otherwise silent- on the
subject 70 or even, apparently, to find new constitutionally-protected
fundamental rights lurking in the "penumbra" of constitutional
doctrine.
71
These broad enforcement powers, of course, stand in stark
contrast to those possessed by international tribunals such as the
International Court of Justice. There are no sergeants-at-arms in
international law; the international legal system enjoys no monopoly
of coercive power of the sort possessed by domestic jurisdictions.
Indeed, it is often described as a defining feature of the international
arena that it is characterized by "anarchy"-that is, a situation in
which coercive force is employed by actors themselves in "self-help"
rather than by any form of central authority.72 Due to this lack of
enforced sovereign command, some writers have even gone so far as
to deny that international law is "law" at all.73
In an environment of legal "subjects" who are generally quite
well armed and often willing to "enforce" their perceived rights
independent of the imprimatur of international legality, the interna-
tional jurist can only really rely upon persuasive power for the
enforcement of his judgments. This places particular constraints upon
the exercise of judicial discretion-and even upon the adjudication of
intermediate and easy cases. An international tribunal, unable to rely
upon compelling institutional means of enforcing the law it declares,
69. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 742-44 (1957) (recounting domestic jurisdictions then
permitting recourse to "general principles" of law in order to fill lacunae).
70. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,13 n.9 (1971), for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted private suits under a provision of federal securities
law, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934), which contained no provision for such a private cause of action.
71. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, found a constitutionally-protected right of
privacy to exist in the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations from those
guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). This right of privacy
subsequently became the core of the Court's establishment of a constitutional right to abort a
pregnancy in its first trimester in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Though the focus of bitter
and prolonged domestic political controversy, the "essential holding" of Roe-that a woman's
right to abort a pregnancy before fetal viability may not "unduly" be infringed-was reaffirmed
as a constitutional requirement by a majority of the Supreme Court in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
72. See, eg., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 127-36 (1977).
73. See, eg., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 201 (1954).
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faces a considerable challenge. The law, in such circumstances, will
only be obeyed to the extent that the articulate jurist can make his
case logically and morally irresistible, and to the extent that the
perceived disadvantages of compliance are not such that governments
will disregard the political compliance pull of a persuasive argument.
While it might even be true that most nations obey most international
laws most of the time74 this international context makes the exercise
of judicial discretion particularly delicate.
a. The Problem of Lacunae. Hard cases, the jurisprudential
situs of discretion, may occur not only when prevailing legal norms
permit more than one legitimate legal outcome, but also when a gap
in settled law leaves the jurist with nothing to say on a matter
presented to it without resorting to the purposeful and discretionary
formulation of a new norm.75 Such outcomes of non liquet are hard
cases as surely as are Barak's multiple-solution problems. For a
variety of reasons, international law is particularly threatened by the
possibility of non liquet.
Lacking the formal institution of a legislature, international
"statutory" law76 is notoriously thin, consisting only of the body of
written treaty and convention texts upon which the world's jealous
sovereigns can bring themselves to agree. Customary international
law, a normative source also explicitly endorsed by the Statute of the
International Court of Justice,' may provide useful guidance.
However, customary international law's ability to create generally
applicable norms is constrained by the need not only to demonstrate
a clear customary practice not derogated by non-observance, but by
the possibility that "persistent objector" status could limit obligations
upon any particular state. Moreover, if customary law is to be taken
as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law," the element of
74. Thomas Franck, for example, has noted the remarkable degree to which even
superpowers observe inconvenient rules, and examines the characteristics of international legal
norms which can bring about compliance in the absence of coercive enforcement. See THOMAS
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3-4 (1990).
75. See, e.g., BARAK, supra note 28, at 40 (arguing that in "hard" cases, "the judge is faced
with a number of possibilities, all of which are lawful within the context of the system").
76. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as we have seen,
authorizes the court to consider those "international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(a), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
77. Id. at art. 38, § 1(b) (authorizing recourse to "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law").
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opinio juris is required-international actors must follow the rule
because they believe it a legitimate and binding rule, and not for
other reasons.78
To make matters worse, Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ
restricts reliance upon international judicial precedent. By such a
view, "judicial decisions" are relegated to the status of mere "subsid-
iary means for the determination of rules of law"-of no more
importance than the mere opinion of legal scholars.79 Nevertheless,
Article 38 would still permit prior ICJ case law to constitute a formal
"source of law." More worrisome is Article 59 of the Statute of the
Court, which provides that a decision of the ICJ "has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. ' 8°
The stark terms of Article 59 appear, on their face, to "preclude_ the
Court from adopting any doctrine similar to the Anglo-American
doctrine of stare decisis."' As is suggested by its reference to
"parties" and "decision," however, Article 59 may concern itself solely
with the binding character of what Shabtai Rosenne has called
"contentious litigation '' -2 namely, litigation between two disputants
rather than at the request of the UN General Assembly, the Security
Council or other duly authorized UN agencies or organs pursuant to
Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the
Court.' By this interpretation, Kenneth Keith has written: "Article
78. The existence of a customary rule may be seen by examining: (1) the extent, consistency
and frequency of departures from the candidate norm; (2) the relation of both adhering and
departing states concerned to the subject matter of the rule; (3) the time over which the norm
is alleged to have developed; and (4) whether or not adhering states consider such a rule to be
the law (opinio juris). See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 37-40 (2d ed. 1987).
79. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
80. Id. art. 59.
81. MANLEY OTIMER HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 536
(1934).
82. SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT v
(1965).
83. See, eg., KENNETH KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 28-29 (1971) (arguing that Article 59 phrasing suggests
limitation to "contentious decisions" and that choice of word "decision" over broader term
"judgment" suggests application only to "the operative portion of a judgment"). Rosenne
includes his discussion of res judicata and Article 59 under his discussion of "contentious
litigation" rather than that concerned with advisory opinions, see ROSENNE, supra note 82, at
624 ("Article 59 determines the material limits of resjudicata, and Article 60 its formal value."),
and even in discussing Article 59, seems to accord the Court the ability to develop precedent
on general rules of law, id. at 624 ("The protracted proceedings in the Corfu Channel and
Asylum cases gave the present Court an opportunity of developing its jurisprudence on the
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59 relates solely to the operative part of the judgment and to the
question of res judicata [as specifically binding upon disputants] and
accordingly is not concerned, in any way with the value of earlier
cases as authoritative statements of law."'
[I]n applying general rules of law to particular cases, it was
inevitable that the Court should perform a law-developing function.
In course of time, through what in French has been called "une
jurisprudence constante" and because of jurisdictional continuity
between the [Permanent Court of International Justice and the
ICJ], a sizeable body of case-law has accumulated which is "a
tangible contribution to the development and clarification of the
rules and principles of international law. '
Even on Keith's view of the validity of ICJ judicial precedent,
however, Article 38 still expressly relegates international decision law
to the status of a "subsidiary" source of dispositive rules. 6
subject.").
84. KEITH, supra note 83, at 29.
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(1972); see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3,
at 64 (Feb. 5) (Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice) ("[S]ince specific legislative action with
direct binding effect is not at present possible iri the international legal field, judicial
pronouncements of one kind or another constitute the principal method by which the law can
find some concrete measure of clarification and development."), quoted in LYNDELL V. PROTr,
THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 78 (1979).
86. Moreover, some nations, such as the United States, a principal architect of both the
League of Nations and the United Nations systems, have long resisted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ. On the eve of the ICJ's jurisdictional consideration of the Military and
Paramilitary Activities case, the United States formally attempted to withdraw from the Court's
jurisdiction by modifying its 1946 Declaration of Acceptance. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392 (Nov. 26) (detailing the dispute over U.S. attempt to
withdraw from compulsory jurisdiction). Article 36 of the Statute of the Court provides that
states may "at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning" the interpretation of a treaty, questions of international
law or fact, or the nature and extent of reparations for breach of international law. Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36(2)(a)-(d), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1179. The U.S.'s Declaration of Acceptance pursuant to Article 36 had reserved a right
to withdraw from jurisdiction upon six months notice, but did not expressly contain a right to
"modify." Thus the Court found that the alleged 1984 "modification" was ineffective for lack
of the six months notice required under the 1946 document. The I.C.J. noted, however, that
"the declarations made under Article 36 by a number of other States" do in fact reserve a "right
of modification" similar to that unsuccessfully asserted by the U.S. in 1984. Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.CJ. 392, § 53 (Nov. 26).
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i. International Judicial Law-Creation. The contractual
tradition of international law-seeing international obligations as
deriving exclusively from the express or implied consent of sovereign
states-has made it very difficult for international jurisprudence to
embrace any law-creating role for international courts. In the
traditional view, echoed, for example, in the case of the S.S. "Lotus,"
"the very nature and existing conditions of international law" ensured
that "[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot be
presumed."'  The law reached only what sovereign states agreed to
permit it to reach; all that was not expressly prohibited was, in effect,
permitted. More precisely, relations between states were governed,
not by "law," but by the traditional checks and balances of military
and economic force.' In such a system, non liquet was clearly not
an embarrassing exception, an example of law's failure; it was, rather,
the default mode of international jurisprudence, and therefore entirely
unsurprising. By such an interpretation, non liquet hard cases might
be endemic, since the law could frequently fail to provide a clear
answer to a problem submitted for decision. This was not felt to be
a problem, however. International legal tribunals were not expected
to have any power to "create" law to fill such interstices, and unlike
Barak's domestic judges, international jurists were neither expected
nor permitted to use judicial discretion. As non liquet was a
permissible outcome, the use of judicial discretion in the creation of
legal norms was unnecessary.
The adjudication of international cases became problematic,
however, when this assumption changed-when non liquet came to be
felt as an impermissible outcome. A corresponding revolution in the
power granted international jurists in the exercise of discretion was
necessary. By the early years of this century, the balance of opinion
in the international legal community had shifted powerfully against
non liquet."9 Many leading scholars came to feel a prohibition upon
87. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
88. In the Lotus case, the French government had contended that in order for Turkey to
be able to extend its jurisdiction to the high seas collision at issue, it must be able to "point to
some title to jurisdiction recognized by international law." The Court disagreed, finding that
international law "leaves [States] in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable." Id.
89. Part of this shift may have been due to the influence of the late-19th century drive for
the codification of both domestic and international law. Jeremy Bentham was apparently the
first to suggest compiling international law into a great "Digest." See 8 JEREMY BENTHAM,
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non liquet to be virtually an a priori axiom of law,' or one so firmly
entrenched that it constituted "one of the most undisputably
established rules of positive international law as evidenced by an
uninterrupted continuity of international arbitral and judicial
practice."
91
ii. The Need for Discretion. To ban non-liquet, however, was
to institutionalize the need for judicial discretion. Scholars such as
Roscoe Pound soon realized that
[g]iven the rule, common to so many systems, that the judge must
render a decision regardless of the silence or apparent contradiction
of the texts, a respectable name, if not a substitute, must be found
for the personal, professional, or community preference, the rule of
thumb or hunch, to which he must have recourse. Since codes
cannot cover all contingencies, and since cases of first impression
must occur in common law jurisdictions, the prohibition of non
liquet demands recognition of such rationes decidendi as have been
WORKS 537 (Bowring ed., 1843), quoted in P.J. Baker, The Codification of International Law,
5 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 38, 38 (1924). It was, however, the advent of the great "law-making
treaty" in the late 19th century-beginning with the provisions of the Congress of Vienna
regulating the regime of international rivers and the slave trade, see R.Y. Jennings, The Progress
of International Law, 34 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 334, 342 n.2 (1958) [hereinafter Jennings,
Progress]-which marked the arrival of a powerful movement dedicated to international legal
codification. See R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law and its
Codification, 24 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 301, 301 n.2 (1947) [hereinafter Jennings, Codification]
(recounting major multinational efforts at codification from 1815 Congress of Vienna to 1930
Hague Conference). Many of the great societies of international law were founded expressly
for the purpose of aiding codification, see, eg., Jennings, Progress, supra, at 344 n.3, and leading
scholars flocked to its banner. See Baker, supra, at 38 (recounting prominent 19th-century legal
thinkers who supported codification, including Bluntschli, Mancini, Field, Levy, and Fiore).
Drawing strength from the success of efforts to codify domestic law, see generally J.L. Brierly,
The Future of Codification, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1931), the movement for the codification
of international law apparently came to see non liquet outcomes as embarrassing failures that
highlighted the "incompleteness" of international law and inhibited its progressive development.
A prohibition upon non liquet, it may have been felt, would not only prevent particular cases
from inconclusive outcome, but also harness the engine of judicial discretion to the development
of international jurisprudence.
90. Julius Stone credits Kelsen, Radbruch, Cossio and Garcia Maynez with this view. Julius
Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community, 35 BRr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 124, 127 (1959).
91. Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of "Non Liquet" and the
Completeness of the Law, in SYMBOLAE VERzuL 196, 200 (1958), quoted in Stone, supra note
90, at 128.
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found in "natural law," "natural equity, .... reason," or "general
principles of law."'
This clearly describes something that begins to approach what Barak
sees in judges' exercises of judicial discretion.93 The central issue in
the non liquet debate, therefore, was less at "the technical legal level"
than at the level of "the law-creative as distinct from the merely
law-applying competence of international courts."'94 As Julius Stone
observed, "to prohibit non liquet entails the imposition upon the
Court of a duty to develop new rules limited only by the novelty and
range of the matters coming before it for decision."'95 Significantly,
the need for a gap-filling rule, noted Pound, was particularly
important in international law, where "most of the normative material
is not only in dispute but also in constant flux. '96
By the early twentieth century, judicial discretion was not felt to
be as problematic as it had been for the legal positivists. The impact
of legal realist theory upon legal scholarship-fostering an apprecia-
tion of the role of the judge as "an intelligent collaborator of the
legislator in the application of this living law"' in the international
as well as the domestic context-made it possible to conceive of a
system which depended upon the exercise of discretion in order to
avoid non liquet in international jurisprudence. Baron Descamps, the
chairman of the Committee of Jurists that drafted the statute of the
92. Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L.
REV. 475, 483-84 (1933).
93. Cf. BARAK, supra note 28, at 133. Barak, however, is unwilling to leave merely "a
respectable name" to cover a situation in which "personal considerations are decisive..." Id.
at 121. In his formulation, the judge must articulate each step in the reasoning taken and justify
any "intuitive" insights in rational terms:
In determining the best solution, the judge is sometimes aided by his intuition. He
operates according to that internal sense that creates a link between the problem and
its solution. At times the judge senses the desired result even before he has given
himself an accounting as to the appropriate path for getting to the appropriate result.
Thus, intuition plays a role in judicial discretion. The judge is human, and
intuition plays an important role in the activities of every person. But it does not
follow that judicial discretion begins and ends with intuition. Intuition must be
reviewed, must go through a process of rationalization....
... In the final analysis, judicial discretion must be expressed in rational thought,
not in a subjective sense. This is the responsibility required of the judicial function.
Id. at 133-35.
94. Stone, supra note 90, at 127.
95. Id. at 132.
96. Pound, supra note 92, at 484.
97. CtHENG, supra note 64, at 17.
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Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), for example, went
so far as to argue that the Court ought to be permitted recourse to
the law of objective justice, at any rate in so far as it has twofold
confirmation of the concurrent teachings of jurisconsults of
authority and of the public conscience of civilised nations.... [T]he
conception of justice and injustice as indelibly written on the hearts
of civilised peoples [is] ... an indispensable complement to the
application of law, and as such essential to the judge in the
performance of the great task entrusted to him.98
This contention resonates strongly with natural law theory, a theory
which Barak does not endorse. Insofar, however, as Descamps would
permit an international jurist to invoke the broader values of the legal
community (here, in the international context, the whole of humani-
ty), these sentiments dovetail neatly with Barak's understanding of
judicial discretion in the domestic arena.
Despite the sovereign-contractarian traditions of European
international law, the use of judicial discretion in international
jurisprudence gradually became conceivable. As Pound suggests,
moreover, international law would seem likely-to the extent that it
presents its tribunals with cases at all -- to provide jurists with a
lacuna type of hard case with greater frequency than occurs in
domestic jurisprudence. Yet international law deprives its jurists of
many of the tools-by, for example, constraining their ability to
formulate new norms binding upon parties as precedent1 4 --which
assist domestic judges in the exercise of their judicial discretion.
These crucial differences in context between domestic and
international adjudication suggest an exacerbation of the problems
associated with Barak's model of judicial discretion: (1) the difficulty
of a judge's "stepping outside himself;" (2) the difficulty of determin-
ing the cases which genuinely call for the use of discretion; (3) the
difficulty of ascertaining the "value" of the "legal community;" and
98. Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procs-
Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24th, 1920, with Annexes, at
324-25 (1920) [hereinafter Procs-Verbaux], quoted in Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Quest for
General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations-A Study, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1041,
1073 (1963).
99. Because of the often-contested legitimacy of the International Court of Justice, its lack
of enforcement power, and the difficulties of securing jurisdiction over sovereign states
frequently at liberty to decline it, the ICI is presented with only a tiny fraction of the caseload
faced by domestic courts.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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(4) the difficulty posed by the possibility of divided community values.
There remains, however, at least one clear doctrinal window through
which international jurists may exercise this discretion-the "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" authorized as a
source of decisional law by Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
B. General Principles Doctrine and the ICI
Article 38(1)(c) is the ICJ's analog to the authorizations for the
use of discretion to fI legal lacunae given by statute to domestic
courts in many jurisdictions."0 ' At the time the Statute of the
PCIJ' ° was drafted in 1920, the idea that international tribunals
could invoke general principles in order to fill gaps was already well
established in certain international contexts. Some international
treaties and tribunals expressly endorsed the consideration of general
principles of law in the settlement of disputes arising thereun-
der'°3-especially where, in the absence of directly applicable
international law, obtaining rules of decision directly from the
jurisprudence of one disputant would likely be unacceptable to the
other. This sort of reasoning was employed, for example, in Lord
Asquith's arbitration of the Abu Dhabi dispute in 1952." The use
101. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
102. The ICJ inherited Article 38 verbatim from the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the supreme judicial organ of the League of Nations System.
103. The British-U.S. Claims Arbitral Tribunal of 1910, for example, noted that
[i]nternational law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and generally does not
contain, express rules decisive of particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is
to resolve the conflict of opposing rights and interests by applying, in default of any
specific provisions of law, the corollaries of general principles, and so to find... the
solution to the problem.
Quoted by Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreword to CHENG, supra note 64, at xiii.
104. Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144. In Abu Dhabi, a dispute
arose under a 1939 agreement under which the Sheikh had sold oil development rights within
his territorial waters to the Petroleum Development Company. Lord Asquith concluded that
a clause in the agreement which authorized reference to general principles "repels the notion
that the municipal Law of any country, as such, could be appropriate. The terms of that Clause
invite, indeed prescribe, the application of principles rooted in the good sense and common
practice of the generality of civilised nations-a sort of 'modern law of nature."' Id. at 149.
Treaty provisions like that in the Abu Dhabi case were not uncommon. Wolfgang Friedmann,
The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
279, 283 (1963) [hereinafter Friedmann, General Principles]. Lord McNair argued that natural
resource concessions between industrialized Western powers and less developed states would
be particularly well-suited for arbitration according to "general principles." McNair, The
General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-9 (1957)
(arguing that arbitration between industrialized Western powers and less developed states might
19941
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of such principles also appears to have occurred implicitly, or even
without the conscious acknowledgment of the users. As Ignaz
SeidI-Hohenveldern's study of the Conciliation Commissions
established under the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 illustrated,
"[r]ecourse to general principles is by no means limited to cases where
decisions explicitly refer to these principles. In many more cases such
recourse has to be implied from the general context."'10 5
Article 38 merely extended this concept to the ICJ, providing the
Court with authority, through the use of judicial discretion, to invoke
such principles in order to prevent non liquett--an idea that gained
broad acceptance in international law." 7 As Lauterpacht noted in
1927, Article 38(1)(c) gave the official imprimatur of law to the
importation of legal concepts from outside conventional international
treaty and customary law for the purposes of preventing non liquet.
The adoption ... of "general principles of law recognized by
civilized States" as a binding... source of decision in the judicial
settlement of disputes signifies that practice, hitherto unsupported
by universal and authoritative international enactment, and
regarded by many as derogating from the strictly judicial character
of international arbitration, has now received formal approval on
the part of practically the whole international community. There
lies the outstanding, and to a certain extent, revolutionary contribu-
tion made by the Statute to international law as a whole." s
often require the adoption of legal norms as occurred in Abu Dhabi); see also Derek W. Bowett,
State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or
Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49,53 n.19 (1988) (giving as examples of "general principles" the
arbitral cases of Societe Rialet v. Eth., 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 742 (1929), and the Aramco
arbitration, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, at 168-70 (1963)); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1990) (noting common use of "general
principles" formulations in arbitral tribunals in the 19th century).
105. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, General Principles of Law as Applied by the Conciliation
Commissions Established Under the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947,53 AM. J. INT'L L. 853, 872
(1959).
106. Procas-Verbaux, supra note 98, at 338; see generally, Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy
of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 274,279 (1975).
107. In his dissent in the Right of Passage case, for example, Judge Fernandez referred to
"general principles of law ... inherent in the international legal system," of the existence of
which he claimed there was no doubt. "Whatever view may be held in regard to these
principles,... whatever, I say, may be the attitude of each towards the origin and basis of these
principles, all are agreed in accepting their existence and their application as a source of positive
law." Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.CJ. 6, at 136-37 (Apr. 12)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Fernandez).
108. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW viii (2d ed. 1970).
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Georg Schwartzenberger believed that Article 38's legitimization of
the use of judicial discretion in international law through the
invocation of general principles,
enabled the Court to replenish [sic], without subterfuge, the rules
of international law by principles of law tested within the shelter of
more mature and closely integrated legal systems. [It] opened a
new channel through which concepts of natural law could be
received into international law .... [It] made it possible for the
World Court to strike out a bolder line in its application of
international law than, in the absence of such wide reserve powers,
the Court might have found it possible to take.... [It] threw out
a challenge to the Doctrine of International Law to sail into new
and uncharted seas."°
The drafters of Article 38 deliberately empowered future Courts "to
develop and refine the principles of international jurisprudence.""'
The invocation of general principles under the aegis of Article
38(1)(c) is thus, at least potentially, an important area of international
law. Indeed, as we have seen, it appears to be virtually the only
doctrinally-permissible way that judicial discretion may be employed
by the ICJ. How, then, are international jurists to pick, from among
the universe of candidate norms, those which are "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations?"
1. The Invocation of General Principles. International legal
scholars have long disagreed over how general principles are to be
identified. To begin with, the "civilized nations" phrasing, though
depicted by Judge Ammoun in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
as a relic of European chauvinism,"' is today regarded as a term of
art referring merely to states with well-developed legal systems and
implying no racial or cultural prejudice."' Evaluating the "general"
109. Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreword to CHENG, supra note 64, at xi.
110. BROWNLE, supra note 104, at 16.
111. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.CJ. 4, at 132-40
(Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun).
112. According to Hugh Thirlway,
the only intention of the inclusion [of this phrase] was surely to limit consideration of
municipal systems to those which are sufficiently developed to reveal the extent to
which they share underlying principles, rather as in the Abu Dhabi arbitration it was
necessary to exclude the local law simply because that law had nothing to say on the
subject.
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nature of a particular norm, however, is much more difficult. Two
basic schools of thought exist on the subject, which will here be called
the comparativist approach and the categoricist approach. Neither
school, however, supplies a means of determining general principles
that Justice Barak would find to be an acceptable use of judicial
discretion. It is only with the development of a synthesis of these two
approaches-a process apparently now underway-that general
principles doctrine has begun to fit itself into Barak's scheme of
judicial discretion and the objectivity test.
a. Comparativism. One approach to the determination of
general principles under Article 38 has been simply to treat paragraph
(1)(c) as an international jurist's invitation to undertake a colossal
comparative-law project.
[A]n examination of these principles means a pragmatic attempt to
find from the major legal systems of the world the maximum
measure of agreement on the principles relevant to the case at
hand .... [T]he aim is to use comparative law as a guide .... This
will, in most though by no means in all cases, involve a comparison
of the relevant principles of the most representative systems of the
common-law and the civil law world. In certain cases it may be
necessary to examine some of the non-Western legal systems, such
as Muslim or Hindu law, now actively represented in the family of
nations. 13
Hugh Thiriway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989: Part
Two, 61 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 124 [hereinafter Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two].
Jennings argues that the term refers to those societies which have organized themselves into
governments capable of acting in the international arena. "The international test of civilization,"
he contends, is "simply government." Jennings, Progress, supra note 89, at 352.
113. Friedmann, General Principles, supra note 104, at 284-85. Note, however, that in writing
that purely comparativist scholarship would be needed to determine "the principles that, in the
circumstances of the case, are most appropriate and equitable," Friedmann presupposes some
antecedent standards for judging propriety and equity. Despite the scientific pretensions of the
comparativist method, the need to pick "proper and equitable" principles still necessitates the
employment of judicial discretion. As Barak notes, judges are frequently asked to interpret legal
norms according to principles such as "morality" and "justice"-to which Friedmann would
apparently have us add "propriety" and "equity." "Principles," writes Barak, "do not come
equipped with a list of the situations to which they will apply in the future. They constitute the
starting point for balancing and weighing." BARAK, supra note 28, at 50. "In certain cases...
no principle is sufficiently specific under the circumstances, so the judge is left with discretion
in making the choice among the different (narrow or broad) possibilities." Il at 51. It is crucial
to Barak's argument that at some point, even if only in the interpretation of norms expressed
in the imprecisions of everyday human language, judicial discretion is always necessary. See id.
at 46-50.
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The test of a "general principle" was said by the comparativists to be
that "it is recognized in substance by all the main systems of law,"
and that by applying it the judge would not be "doing violence to the
fundamental concepts of any of those systems.""' 4 "A principle of
law is a general one," it was felt, "if it is being applied by the most
representative systems of municipal law . . .. What is usually
required is that the principle pervades the municipal law of nations in
general.""' 5
To this end, massive comparative law projects were begun by
academics like Rudolf Schlesinger, dedicated to discovering in the
apparent legal diversity of the world"6 some "common sub-stratum
of institutions and concepts.""17  Surveys of municipal law systems
were expected to yield a harvest of legal principles general by virtue
simply of ubiquity,"' principles "so common to the various national
legal systems of the world that they compose, independently of
custom or treaty, general international law.""' 9 In an attempt to
bolster its position in the Right of Passage Case, for example, Portugal
undertook a survey of sixty-four municipal legal systems in order to
114. H.C. GurrERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 65 (2nd ed., 1949), quoted in Friedmann,
General Principles, supra note 104, at 285.
115. F.A. Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 20,
38-39 (1957). The term "municipal" is employed here-and will be employed hereafter-as a
synonym for "domestic" and as the opposite of "international."
116. It is this comparativist approach which held the most attraction for those who despaired
at making much progress in otherwise defining substantive rules of law in a world divided
between starkly contrasting theories of socio-economic organization. As Friedmann put it,
[i]n the present greatly diversified family of nations-which comprises states of starkly
differing stages of economic development, as well as of conflicting political and social
ideologies-the notions, for example, of "equity," "reasonableness" or "abuse of rights"
with respect [for example] to the terms of nationalization of a foreign monopoly or a
vital natural resource do, and are bound to, differ widely. What to the one party is an
abuse is to the other the reassertion of a long withheld "natural" right.
Friedmann, General Principles, supra note 104, at 289. For Mann, cleavages between "States
having heterogenous legal systems" required close attention to the comparativist derivation of
"general" legal rules. Mann, supra note 115, at 38-39.
117. Sarfatti, Roman Law and Common Law: Forerunners of a General Unification of Law,
3 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 110 (1954), quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 69, at 741 n.29.
118. Such surveys might also be of use in clarifying, for international purposes, terms and
concepts without previous definition in international jurisprudence. In a study of international
law with respect to the International Monetary Fund, for example, Fawcett suggested that the
"general principles" formulation could be useful in allowing jurists to construe terms such as
"loan," "net income," and "capital" by means of "a comparative study of their use in different
systems of municipal law, which may uncover similar concepts generally applied." J.E.S.
Fawcett, The Place of Law in an International Organization, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 321, 342
(1960).
119. William R. Hearn, The International Legal Regime Regulating Nuclear Deterrence and
Warfare, 61 BRrr. Y.B. INTL L. 199, 225 (1990).
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show the general acceptance of rules recognizing a right of passage for
enclaved territory. Its finding that sixty-one of these systems
recognized such a right prompted Portugal to conclude that "the
municipal laws of the civilized nations are unanimous."12
As the Portuguese example suggests, however, this comparative
method was ponderous. Worse, it produced few results. One
discouraged comparativist scholar complained in 1944:
It is not possible to enumerate the principles of private law which
can be regarded as "general" principles which are "recognized by
civilized nations," [and] it would seem that such principles must be
rare, partly because there is little or no scope for the employment
of any save the main principles of law for this purpose, and, partly
because such exploration of the field as has been attempted appears
to indicate that there are few principles of this description."'
Not only were the scholarly efforts involved enormously
time-consuming, they produced few results in an ideologically and
economically polarized twentieth-century world that found universal
agreement on most ideas enormously difficult."
To avoid making findings of general principles hostage to the
unlikely existence of jurisprudential consensus under such circum-
stances, some legal scholars propounded a variant upon general
120. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 at 11-12
(Portuguese final submissions). Because Portugal's argument was based primarily upon general
and special practice rather than upon "general principles," however, the Court did not reach this
issue. See generally Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 120.
121. H.C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law and the Law of Nations, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
5 (1944) [hereinafter Gutteridge, Law of Nations]. Gutteridge noted that "[a] high degree of
caution is, in fact, essential before any private law principle or analogy can be accepted as
conforming to the standard of universal or general recognition which has been adopted as the
test for its employment.for international purposes." Id. at 1.
122. One study of the decisions of the Conciliation Commissions established under the
Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 indicated, for example, that even when jurists were taken only from
Western European legal backgrounds they had enormous difficulty in agreeing upon dispositive
substantive rules. "Not only the parties to the disputes or the national members but also the
various neutral members sometimes disagree as to the existence or content of general principles.
Such disagreement seems to result at least partially from a sub-conscious assumption that the
general principles of national law of the member concerned will or ought to be recognized
universally as general principles." Though all of them were Western Europeans there were still
"some differences in approach between Commission members from civil law countries and
Anglo-American members." The study concluded that: "[i]f researches were to be extended so
as to test each alleged general principle as to whether it is really recognized as such by all the
legal systems of the world, comparatively few 'principles' will emerge as being indeed generally
recognized." Seidl-Hohenveldern supra note 105, at 872.
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acceptance. These scholars aspired to judge the universality of a
proposition, not against a census of municipal systems, but by looking
to whether it received the support of a representative sample of the
different types of socio-economic organization-such as, for example,
the leading states of each of the world's capitalist, socialist and
"non-aligned" blocs.Y Such a standard of "system-representative"
support would find propositions general to the extent they gained
support from suitably representative states of the principal systemic
ordering of countries. 4
In addition to its practical problems-for example, not all general
principles explicitly or implicitly cited by the Court or its judges had
clear origins in municipal law"--deriving general principles from
123. This was, for example, the position of many Soviet scholars, such as Tunkin, with
respect to the law-creating power of General Assembly resolutions. See, e.g., GRIGORI TUNKIN,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-172 (Butler trans., 1974).
124. This representativeness test was also employed in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
arbitration, where an arbiter found UN Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962 to have
controlling legal force on a question relating to the nationalization of Western firms involved
in natural resource extraction. This resolution was deemed authoritative because, in contrast
to Resolutions 3171 (XXVII), 3201 (S-VI), and 3281 (XXIX), it had been supported by a
systemic cross-section of the international community:
It is particularly important to note that the majority voted for this text, including many
States of the Third World, but also several Western developed countries with market
economies, including the most important one, the United States. The principles stated
in this Resolution were therefore assented to by a great many States representing not
only all geographic areas but also all economic systems.
Texaco Overseas Pet. et al. v. Lib. Arab Rep., Jan. 19, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 1, paras. 84-85, at 28-29
(1978).
Some of the decision-making processes of the UN Commission for International Trade are
also said "to be guided by the principle of equitable geographical distribution, and also to have
regard to the principle that, in the Commission as a whole, an adequate representation of
countries of free enterprise and centrally-planned economies, and of developed and developing
countries, should be assured." T.O. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 387 (2d
ed. 1992).
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judge Manfred Lachs' dissenting opinion spelled
out a standard for judging the "general acceptance of a given instrument" by looking at its
support among states "considered as having a special and immediate interest" in that instrument.
There, Lachs concluded that "from the viewpoints both of number and of representativity, the
participation in the Convention constitutes a solid basis for the formation of a general rule of
law." North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, at 222-28
(Feb. 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs).
125. Without any suggestion that the principle derived from universality in municipal law,
for example, the ICJ ruled in Temple of Preah Vihear that it was "an established rule of law"
that "the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing
it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances
were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error." Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.CJ. 6, at 26 (June 15). In the same case, Judge Alfaro also argued
that certain estoppel effects were controlling by virtue of having been "known to the world since
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comprehensive surveys of municipal law was felt to have theoretical
weaknesses as well. As South African Judge ad hoc Van Wyk
explained in the South West Africa cases in 1966, Article 38 did not
authorize "the application of the laws of civilized nations," but rather
"limits the Court to 'the general principles of law' of these nations.
It certainly does not mean that by legislating on particular domestic
matters a majority of civilized nations could compel a minority to
introduce similar legislation. 126 Something more was needed than
simply a comparative-law census, as even Judge Tanaka agreed."
A rigidly comparativist approach also seemed inconsistent with
the generally accepted maxim'P that one should not be held ac-
countable for failing to observe laws the existence of which one was
unaware:
When the Court takes into consideration an alleged rule or
principle of law, it is doing so, as it were, retrospectively, in order
to measure against it the conduct or claims of a State. It must,
however, be possible equally to refer to the same rule or principle
prospectively: a State which is considering a particular course of
action must be able to ascertain whether that course would or
would not infringe a rule of law... The legal adviser of a foreign
ministry is however unlikely to be a specialist in comparative law.
... The conclusion must be that it is insufficient to point to
unanimity of municipal legal systems on a particular point unless
the days of the Romans." Id. at 42-43. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court
seemed to suggest that general principles of a sort could be derived not only through adoption
from municipal systems but through international custom, see Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part
Two, supra note 112, at 122-23, such that municipal acceptance is not always required. The ICJ's
holding in the 1966 South West Africa case that no right to sue in the public interest could be
found in international law despite existing in certain municipal systems suggests that the Court
might not have recognized an actio popularis even if present in all domestic systems of law.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.CJ. 6, at 45 (July 18). See also
Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 113; see also South West Africa Case,
1966 I.C.J. at 44 (July 18) (noting the difference between international law and domestic law in
that "[i]n the international field, the existence of legal obligations that cannot in the last resort
be enforced ... has always been the rule rather than the exception.").
126. 1966 I.CJ. at 170. But see Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at
119 (arguing that "general principles" are characterized by "ubiquity or near ubiquity" in
municipal law).
127. South West Africa, 1966 I.CJ. at 296-97. (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka)
(recounting Art. 38(1)(c) to be "the product of a compromise" between positivist and naturalist
ideas, so that natural law plays some role in idea of "general principles"); see also Thirlway, The
Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 120-21.
128. "Generally accepted" is used here entirely in the colloquial sense: most legal scholars
appear to feel this an important principle of law, but no comparativist effort has been made
either to canvas the population of legal academics or to survey domestic municipal systems.
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the rule which it is sought to derive from them possesses such a
degree of reasonableness and appropriateness for application on the
international plane for a State which acts in a contrary manner at
least to have been conscious of a possibility that a rule of law might
point in the opposite direction. Put another way,.., the Court will
be slow to recognize the existence of a general principle of law,
even if there is good evidence of unanimity of municipal legal
systems, unless it is such that it would be likely to guide or inspire
State action.129
Moreover, it was feared, if the general principle test of near universal
application in domestic systems was taken too rigidly, comparative law
might offer only meager contributions to international legal develop-
ment.130
Justice Barak's articulation of standards to guide the exercise of
judicial discretion also suggests difficulties with the comparativist
paradigm. Barak emphasizes the importance of forcing judges to
think through the process of using judicial discretion. Judges must be
aware of the existence of judicial discretion, aware of what it means
to use discretion, and aware of the need to formulate the purpose
behind legal norms created by discretion.' The utility of Justice
Barak's approach lies precisely in fostering judges' self-awareness and
in encouraging them to understand and articulate each step in their
reasoning. The defect of the comparativist paradigm, however, is that
it pretends that no discretion is being used.
Despite its aspiration to reduce the discretionary process from
one of actual norm-articulation to one of mere jurisprudential
poll-taking, the comparativist approach does not eliminate the need
for discretion. The jurist seeking to employ this method must pick
"the most representative systems of municipal law"'32 in order to
evaluate their acceptance of a given norm. In applying such a norm,
the jurist must do no "violence to the fundamental concepts of any of
those systems."'" Indeed, the comparative jurist has been said to
have as his goal the identification of "the principles that, in the
129. Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 112-13.
130. See, e g., Gutteridge, Law of Nations, supra note 121, at 9. See also Seidl-Hohenveldem,
supra note 105, at 872 ("[i]f researches were to be extended so as to test each alleged general
principle as to whether it is really recognized as such by all the legal systems of the world,
comparatively few 'principles' will emerge as being indeed generally recognized.").
131. BARAK, supra note 28, at 138.
132. Mann, supra note 115, at 38.
133. GUrTRIDGE, supra note 114, quoted in Friedmann, General Principles, supra note 105,
at 285.
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circumstances of the case, are most appropriate and equitable."'"
All of these determinations require the exercise of discretion in
interpreting their meaning and applying them. The acceptance of
which principle must a judge evaluate? Which municipal legal
systems are representative enough (and of what?) that their accep-
tance of a given principle should be assessed? How similarly must
two systems apply a given principle for it to be considered accepted
by them both? Which version of this principle should be imputed to
international law? What are these municipal systems' fundamental
values and how might they be furthered or harmed by the application
of this norm to the case at hand? On those occasions when the ICJ
has used principles without clear domestic analog,' 35 where on earth
did they come from? To say merely that a particular rule is accepted
by different systems is not necessarily to say that these systems place
the same normative value upon the rule, -or that they employ it for
the same reason or purpose. In fact, "the existence in one or more
municipal systems of a solution to the problem which is attributable
to a quite different principle undermines the credibility of the
principle asserted as a general principle.' 136
Such questions clearly implicate judicial discretion, yet the
comparativist approach hides this discretion behind the purported
certainty of the survey process. It is not admitted that judges are
themselves deciding anything. Rather, judges are said to be merely
canvassing municipal systems in order to determine their common
principles. No effort is made to work through the steps of discretion-
ary reasoning because it is pretended that no discretion is em-
ployed.'37 Barak's effort to compel judges to understand and
explain their decision making is fundamentally betrayed by the
purportedly scientific nature of the comparativist project.
b. Categoricism. Rather than discovering general precepts
through comparative legal scholarship, the categoricist is more
inclined to follow Lord Asquith's reasoning in the Abu Dhabi
134. Friedmann, General Principles, supra note 104, at 285.
135. See supra note 126.
136. Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 119.
137. Michael Wells' comparison of French and American judicial opinions provides an
interesting illustration. Wells, supra note 23. American legal writing, long and discursive almost
to a fault-especially in an era when law clerks have access both to on-line legal databases and
sophisticated word-processing--contrasts sharply with the abbreviated, syllogistic style of French
judicial opinions, in which judges indulge the fiction that they are merely applying the law
without themselves adding to it.
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arbitration. Abu Dhabi adopted certain tenets of statutory construc-
tion from English jurisprudence, not because English law applied to
the facts of the case or because most countries accepted these tenets,
but simply because these principles were felt "so firmly grounded in
reason as to form part of... [a] 'modem law of nature." 138
For the categoricist school, the comparativist project was
pointless. "There is no need to undertake a [comparativist] quest for
that which [in any event] forms the basis of all law."' 39 Concepts
which were truly "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations"-certain notions, perhaps, of procedural fairness, legal
reasoning and inference, or statutory construction4---were seen to
be "general" by virtue of being inherent in the very idea of law.
They would exist in domestic systems, and would perhaps be
discernible by comparative inquiry, but the real test was not universal
domestic consensus but a sort of transcendental propriety. As Bin
Cheng explained, "[t]his part of international law does not consist,
therefore, in specific rules formulated for practical purposes, but in
general propositions underlying the various rules of law which express
the essential qualities of juridical truth itself, in short of Law."'' It
would therefore be to "no avail," he wrote,
to ask whether these principles are general principles of interna-
tional law or of municipal law; for it is precisely of the nature of
these principles that they belong to no particular system of law, but
are common to them all. The general principles of law envisaged
by Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the World Court are indeed
138. In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and
the Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, 1 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 251 (1952). Judge Fernandez, in the Right of
Passage case, seems to have reasoned in this fashion, concluding that the principle of "mutual
respect for sovereignties" entailed, "as a logical consequence," that India's recognition of
Portuguese sovereignty also included India's recognition of a right of passage between the
constituent parts of an enclaved territory. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v.
India), 1960 I.CJ. 6 at 135-36 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fernandez).
139. Jalet, supra note 98, at 1086.
140. Even more broadly, certain basic patterns of legal discourse, it has been suggested, "the
formal properties of arguments which satisfy neither the conditions of induction nor those of
deduction, and in which value considerations figure prominently beyond the ends-means nexus
of instrumental rationality," have a characteristic structure and analytical rigor to them which
can generally be recognized as legal reasoning--even though not formally logical in a
mathematical sense. FRIEDRICH R. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON TE
CONDITIONS FOR PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
DOMEsTICs AFFAIRS 12 (1989).
141. CHENG, supra note 64, at 24.
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the fundamental principles of every legal system. Their existence
bears witness to the fundamental unity of law.142
Thus, for Lord Asquith and his intellectual progeny, exhaustive
comparative legal scholarship was not needed; general principles were
inherent in the very nature of law, and might even be discernible from
a single legal system or without reference to any municipal system at
all.
Whereas the comparativist approach possessed a relatively
straightforward, if cumbersome, process by which to evaluate the
general acceptance of a particular principle, categoricism placed itself
solely at the mercy of the decision maker. In the Abu Dhabi
arbitration, being content entirely on his own to winnow principles
general from those particular and to interpret the "'modern law of
nature,"' Lord Asquith had no qualms about exercising his delegated
powers as arbiter. If there is anything to the charges levelled at
responsive schools of judicial method by originalist scholars such as
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia,143 it is perhaps that they ask so
frighteningly much of judicial decision makers. This may, in fact, be
a general weakness of theories focused on legal-community values.
Even by these standards, however, the categoricist self-assurance of
Lord Asquith's general principles jurisprudence seems curiously
boundless.
For this reason, the categoricist approach also falls far short of
Justice Barak's ideal. Here the exercise of discretion is not at all
concealed, of course, yet neither is it channeled through a careful
process of consideration and explanation. To rule no more than that
a principle is "inherent in the very idea of law" or "so firmly
grounded in reason" as to constitute a natural law is in large part to
abandon the principled exercise of discretion. What is lacking is not
an awareness of the existence of discretion-for this, of course, is
abundant-but any indication of the decision maker's consciousness
of the responsibilities inherent in the exercise of that discretion. It is
not simply the judge's job to make the right decision; he must do so
142. Id. at 390. Adherents of this categoricist paradigm could turn, for example, to Jellinek
and Oppenheim, who argued that similarities between certain aspects of private and
international jurisprudence were the result not of conceptual borrowing but of the fact that the
jurisprudential genealogy of each was grounded in prior "conceptions of general jurisprudence
to which by the very nature of things similar rules must apply." LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108,
at 19-20.
143. See supra notes 15-16.
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for the right reasons and explain himself in such a way that the new
norm and the reasoning behind it are apparent both to the disputants
and to third parties, both present and future.'" By providing no
apparent need for judges to justify themselves, the categoricist
approach encourages judges to take the path of least resistance and
avoid both actual consideration of those factors critical to the proper
use of discretion 45 and the careful explication of each decision.
c. An Emerging Synthesis. A more productive approach to
the derivation of general principles (and one more faithful to Justice
Barak) would provide a means of norm-identification that was both
simple enough to be practical but which contained some internal
mechanism for checking the bald exercise of personal judicial
preference. It would, in short, be more faithful to Barak's call for the
informed, self-aware, and articulate exercise of judicial discretion. A
synthesis of these two approaches to general principles jurisprudence
would agree with the categoricists that general principles are somehow
inherent in the concept of legal order and discernible by the wise and
careful judge. Judges, therefore, need neither hold courts hostage to
encyclopedic feats of comparative law scholarship nor mask, the
exercise of judicial discretion.
This third approach, however, might nonetheless look to
comparative methods to evaluate the genuine character of candidate
principles and to act as something of a "reality check" on the exercise
of judicial discretion. While judges need not undertake exhaustive
studies of municipal systems, it must be a part of the judge's
reasoning process-of his stepping outside himself in order to evaluate
the general acceptance of a particular principle-to explicitly consider
the likely receptiveness of different legal systems to the candidate
rule.
Acceptance by a majority of municipal systems, even if ascertain-
able, however, would not necessarily be dispositive. The role of law
in the international system may differ in crucial ways from that of law
in domestic society. It is not preordained that every domestic
principle has a meaningful international analogue at all. The
comparative method, however, might be a useful evaluative tool-a
144. "It is not enough that justice be done; justice must also appear to have been done."
BARAK, supra note 28, at 23-24.
145. See supra note 62.
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check upon the creeping arrogance which might overtake a
categoricist jurist left entirely to his own devices.
Happily, the outlines of such a theoretical synthesis appear to be
increasingly understood in Court doctrine. Thus we find that legal
scholars disown comparativist surveys, yet insist that the widespread
presence of a particular principle in municipal law is still usually
necessary"4 for the principle to be considered general. Municipal
legal systems give the judge a window through which to view other
approaches to justice and proper legal order,"7 but the inquiry
neither starts nor ends there. The recognition of a principle in
municipal law "gives the necessary confirmation and evidence of the
juridical character of the principle concerned,"'" but "the recogni-
tion of a principle by civilized nations... does not mean recognition
by all civilized nations.'
149
The key factor, of which the comparative-categorical synthesis
freely admits, is the role of judicial discretion in interpreting values
and applying norms from areas of well-established law to areas of
indeterminacy through steps of reasoned and carefully explained
inference. As McNair explained, international law "has recruited and
continues to recruit many of its rules and institutions from private
systems of law" not by direct adoption but by "regard[ing] any
features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and
institutions of private law as an indication of policy and princi-
ples.' 150
146. An exception to this would be, of course, any "general principles" which might arise in
international law itself, independently of municipal law. See supra note 126. In such
circumstances, the judge would be expected to attempt to "step outside" both himself and
systems of municipal law in order to evaluate the principle in terms of the values he finds in the
international legal order itself.
147. For Hugh Thirlway, for example, a "recognized general principle" under Article
38(1)(c) is one which "can be regarded, on the basis of the universal or near universal testimony
of municipal legal systems, as part and parcel of universal justice." Thirlway, Law and
Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 125.
148. CHENG, supra note 64, at 25.
149. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.CJ. 6, at 299 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Tanaka).
150. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.CJ. 128, at 148 (July 11) (separate
opinion of Sir Arnold McNair). Cf Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112,
at 118:
When having recourse to municipal law, in search of a principle which may be
sufficiently general to warrant its being treated as 'accepted' by nations, the principle
must be defined in a pure form: the individual subjects of law between whom it
operates must be replaced, as in an algebraic equation, by x and y. Then, in the
context of international law, x and y may be given the values of 'State A' and 'State
B', or 'State' and 'international organization,' for example, and the congruity of the
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The ways in which a given rule may be applied and its role within
a system of legal order vary significantly with context. For example,
while international law and domestic law both follow something akin
to pacta sunt servanda, they have very different ideas about how far
supervening changes in circumstances may be treated as a release
from obligation." Direct translations between domestic and
international jurisprudence may well do violence to the real values
and policies served by principles ostensibly accepted at both levels.
The suitability of adopting norms from one legal context to another
can only be assessed by a judge aware of the importance and
responsibilities of his discretion in the decision-making process and
willing explicitly to examine the role such borrowed rules play in each
legal order.
General principles, then, may be adopted from municipal law, but
they should not reflexively be borrowed "after a census of domestic
systems." Rather, international tribunals should employ
elements of legal reasoning and private law analogies in order to
make the law of nations a viable system for application in a judicial
process.... It is impossible, or at least difficult, for state practice
to evolve the rule of procedure or evidence which a[n international]
court must employ. An international tribunal chooses, edits, and
adapts elements from better developed systems: the result is a new
element of international law the content of which is influenced
historically and logically by domestic law."
principle assessed.
See generally Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1954-1959: General Principles and Sources of International Law, 35 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 183
(1959).
151. See Gutteridge, Law of Nations, supra note 121, at 6. With the coming into force of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, international law may have acquired an
analog to domestic jurisprudential "public policy exceptions" to private contractual freedom, in
the form of the jus cogens clause of the Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344; see also supra note 24.
The different context of international law may sometimes turn even the most generally
accepted of principles on its head. The principle that one should not be a judge in one's own
case, for example, is unquestioned in most municipal systems and has even been called one of
the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." See Friedmann, General
Principles, supra note 104, at 290. As we will see, however, the "own case" prohibition finds a
notable exception in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. See infra text accompanying note 163.
152. BROWNLm, supra note 104, at 16.
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Finding a general principle by reference to municipal law is a process
of principled and analogical reasoning-the sort inescapably requiring
a self-aware decision maker.
Some method of comparative analysis can indeed inform this
process, in particular by encouraging judges to consider whether or
not domestic systems tend to agree on the issue.'53 Just as Justice
Barak's self-awareness is intended to help a judge distance himself
from purely individual processes, a comparativist mental process can
serve as a useful "corrective to any tendency there may be ... to
employ concepts or rules which either .belong exclusively to a single
system or are only to be found in a few of such systems."'' The
heart of the process, however, is not comparison but the exercise of
judicial discretion.
The object seems to be... to provide the judge, on the one hand,
with a guide to the exercise of his choice of a new principle and, on
the other hand, to prevent him from "blindly following the
teaching" of jurists with which he is most familiar "without first
carefully weighing the merits and considering whether a principle
of private law does in fact satisfy the demands of justice" if applied
to the particular case before him... [by] considering whether it isone which finds acceptance in the main systems of civilized law. 5
Comparative studies of the approaches to a problem taken by
different systems of municipal law, therefore, are not rigid tests of a
general principle but merely guideposts to legal decision-making.'5 6
153. Thirlway, Law and Procedure: Part Two, supra note 112, at 119.
154. Gutteridge, Law of Nations, supra note 121, at 10.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 105, at 290. See also Friedmann, General Principles,
supra note 104, at 289. Judge Tanaka, in a dissenting opinion in the 1966 South-West Africa
cases, articulated an approach which partook of the natural law tradition: "[Ilt is undeniable
that in Article 38, paragraph 1(c), some natural law elements are inherent. It extends the
concept of the source of international law beyond the limit of legal positivism according to
which, the States being bound only by their own will, international law is nothing but the law
of the consent and auto-limitation of the State." South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v.
S. Aft.) 1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka). Elsewhere in his
opinion Tanaka buttressed his naturalist theories with reference to an academic study showing
that some basic non-discrimination principle is to be found in "the municipal system of virtually
every State" (though the survey cited actually indicated only that 73% of domestic constitutions
had clauses somehow mandating equality). Id. at 299. Tanaka appeared thus to reflect the
modem synthesis of comparativist and categoricist thinking about Article 38(1)(c): broad
domestic acceptance of a general principle was "the manifestation and concretization of already
existing general principles" rather than their actual source-but both elements were apparently
important. Id. at 300..
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Therefore, the doctrinal synthesis of the comparativist and
categoricist approaches to the derivation of general principles of law
under Article 38(1)(c) goes a long way toward meeting the criteria
suggested by Justice Barak for the proper exercise of responsivist
judicial discretion. The reader will recall, however, that even if his
view of discretionary adjudication is fully accepted by the legal
decision maker, Barak's model poses several interrelated challenges
for the jurist: (1) the challenge of stepping outside one's person in
order to apply the objectivity test; (2) the challenge of distinguishing
discretionary hard cases from those of the intermediate and easy
varieties; (3) the challenge of identifying the values of the legal
community which are to guide the formulation of the new norm; and
(4) the challenge of dealing with potentially divided loyalties among
one's value-constituents.
With respect to the second of these difficulties, an international
judge can hope for little help from this doctrinal synthesis. The lack
of international statutory law, the indeterminacy of customary
practice, and the weakness of judicial precedent as a source of law
under the Statute of the ICJ suggest that hard cases will come up
more frequently in the international, than in the domestic, arena.
With respect to the third and the fourth difficulties, the judge must be
left similarly on his own.
General principles doctrine, however, may be able to help judges
accomplish the task of stepping outside themselves by suggesting the
test of municipal acceptance as one way to help gauge the general
acceptance of a candidate norm. Furthermore, bolstering the exercise
of discretion with a series of comparativist guideposts helps interna-
tional jurists cope with their greatest weakness-the structural
incapacity of the ICJ to enforce its judgments. Significantly, the
retention of a municipal acceptance test in general principles doctrine
gives the Court some defense against accusations of what Hersch
Lauterpacht called international "judicial legislation,"' 57 an interna-
tional term of opprobrium with the substance, though not quite the
spirit, of Justice Scalia's attacks upon the "Imperial Judiciary."
In the peculiar circumstances of ICJ jurisprudence-since the idea
of judicial law-creation has long been resisted by sovereign govern-
ments, the enforcement of Court judgments depends almost entirely
157. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 45 (1934), quoted in Jalet, supra note 98, at
1061 n.117.
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upon moral suasion-the exercise of even the most responsible and
restrained judicial discretion requires a very delicate touch. While
general principles doctrine forswears rigid reliance upon comparative
study for the derivation of general principles, its retention of
comparativist guideposts may be an important tool for the legitimiza-
tion of ICJ judgments: even the most jealously independent of
national sovereigns might find it difficult to deny the legal authority
of a rule accepted as fundamental by his own domestic legal system.
2. Discretion and Value-Communities. Over and above any
subtle doctrinal approaches to deriving general principles under
Article 38(1)(c), the exercise of discretion in the ICJ-in ways of
which Barak would approve-is facilitated by the structure and
procedures of the Court itself Justice Barak's objectivity test asks a
judge "to give expression to what appears to him to be the basic
conception of the society (the community) in which he lives and
acts."'58 As we have seen, however, this exhortation can pose great
difficulties where the relevant legal community is divided on a subject,
or where no clear values can be identified.
The domestic judge takes his legal community as a given: in
norm-creating situations, the legal community test forces him to
represent the values of a legal community possessing particular
geographic and jurisdictional frontiers. In the American legal system,
for example, this might be a particular state (say, Ohio), a particular
Federal Circuit, or the United States as a whole. Though the
boundaries of this community are clear, problems with the application
of Justice Barak's methodology increase as the defined community
grows larger. The greater and more diverse the population falling
within its borders, the greater the likelihood of value-heterogeneity on
a particular issue. Thus, it is more difficult for the judge to identify
a basic conception capable of guiding his articulation of a new legal
norm. There are, in effect, diseconomies of scale in the exercise of
judicial discretion.
These problems are potentially the most acute, of course, at the
international level. The ICJ has a jurisdictional constituency
encompassing virtually all of humanity-the value-diversity within its
legal community is definitionally maximal. Thus, if international
jurists were expected to act exactly like domestic jurists, the applica-
tion of Justice Barak's objectivity test would be very difficult indeed.
158. BARAK, supra note 28, at 12.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Fortunately, however, ICJ judges are different from domestic judges
in some crucial ways; the structure and procedures of the ICJ are
remarkably well adapted to coping with the challenges of exercising
judicial discretion.
3. The Structure and Procedure of the ICJ. Under Article 2
of the ICJ Statute, no more than two of the Court's fifteen judges
may be of the same nationality.159 This rule guarantees considerable
national diversity. Under Article 4, furthermore, they are to be
elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council from a list
of persons "nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration."'" Most importantly, however, their selection is
intended to advance certain important values of
"representativeness."'61 According to Article 9 of the Statute, the
electors in the General Assembly and the Security Council are
instructed to "bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected
should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that
in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world be
assured."162
ICJ adjudication differs dramatically from municipal adjudication
in another important way. In domestic courts, a judge with an
interest in the outcome is generally expected to recuse himself from
consideration of the matter in which his interest lies, but under
Article 31 of the Statute of the ICJ, a party to a dispute whose
nationality is not represented on the bench is entitled to appoint its
own judge ad hoc."6  This measure highlights the peculiar
constituency-representative function of ICJ decision making; it helps
to ensure the perceived political and doctrinal legitimacy of any
general principles thereafter relied upon in decisions-a vital function
159. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
993, 3 Bevans 1179.
160. Md. art. 4.
161. Id.
162. d art. 9.
163. "Judges of the nationality of each of the parties [to a dispute before the Court] shall
retain their right to sit in the case before the Court." Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 31(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. "If the Court includes
upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a
person to sit as judge." Id. art. 31(2). "If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the
nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge.... ." Id. art.
31(3).
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in a system in which judicial pronouncements can rely on little more
than moral suasion for their enforcement.164
The members of the ICJ are thus in a very different position than
domestic judges. While both domestic and international jurists aspire
to personal objectivity, there is no domestic analogue to an interna-
tional jurist's representation of his legal community. Both varieties
of judge must at some point step outside the legal systems at the head
of which they sit: just as it is the role of Barak's domestic jurist to
exercise discretion as the agent of the entire community, it is the role
of the ICJ, as a whole, to decide legal questions and to exercise
judicial discretion as the legal embodiment of the entire international
community. Crucially, however, individual international judges must
also be value-partisans. They must represent the values of their home
legal communities on the Court in order to ensure the jurisprudential
interaction deemed essential to the proper exercise of international
judicial discretion.
It should be emphasized that it is not the international jurist's
only responsibility to serve as a partisan of his own domestic legal
values. Since the values and policies served by legal principles in the
international and domestic arenas may vary considerably, a Court
consisting of jurists loyal only to their own domestic legal systems
would betray its obligation to exercise discretion with attention to the
unique circumstances of international jurisprudence.16 International
law often requires methods very different than merely the analogical
adoption of domestic rules and concepts. Nor, it should be added, is
it the function of a judge actually to represent his country's position
or claims before the Court; particularly where a judge's home country
is a disputant, this would be a great corruption of his role in the
exercise of judgment, and is in any case presumably adequately filled
by his country's litigation counsel. A judge must be able to judge, be
able independently to evaluate the merits of the claim according to
both his domestic and his international value-community-and, since
national governments by no means invariably live up to their legal
164. See PROTr, supra note 85, at 110-13 (noting importance of judge ad hoc in playing a
"conciliatory role" and bolstering "the acceptability of the Court's entire activity" whether he
votes with majority or minority).
165. Furthermore, some apparently general principles invoked by the Court have no clear
origins in domestic jurisprudence, and may reflect the belief that the international system itself
can call forth, on its own, principles satisfying the criteria of Article 38(1)(c). See supra note 125
and accompanying text.
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ideals, this may well include finding for the opposing litigant." It
is therefore essential that the judge ad hoc possess at least some
"freedom to disregard his role as a patriot."'67 Individual judges
must therefore wear two hats: that of a representative of their own
legal civilizations and that of a member of a bench having special
responsibilities within the system of international legal order.'"
The Court's structural design, therefore, effectively incorporates
a methodology with powerful comparativist overtones. Article 9
suggests that the approval of a majority of the judicial "representa-
tives" of the world's "main forms of civilization and... principal legal
systems," is required before any decision can be reached. 6 9 The
Committee of Jurists which drafted the PCIJ Statute (a direct forerun-
ner to the ICJ Statute), included these provisions in order to ensure
that, "whenever a particular legal system is involved in a case.., the
other systems of law [will] be brought into line with it, so that the
Bench may really and permanently represent the legal conceptions of
all nations."'7 0  In exercising judicial discretion under Article
38(1)(c) therefore, the Court has generally supported the confluence
of its jurists' opinions.
Such a method affords sufficient safeguards, the judges having been
elected so as ensure "the representation of the main forms of
civilization and the principal legal systems of the world" .... [I]n
view of this it may be conceded that anything which all the judges
of the Court are prepared to accept as a "general principle of law"
must in fact be "recognized by all civilized nations."'
The quasi-comparativist method incorporated, sub silentio, into ICJ
decision making thus closely parallels the requirements of both
166. Though "[t]he performance of the various judges ad hoc has been very uneven," even
some ad hoc judges, for example, have the courage to do precisely this. See PROTT, supra note
85, at 111-13.
167. Id at 19. The challenges of what Prott calls "inter-role conflict" are thus particularly
acute for judges appointed ad hoc. While present to some degree with any judge on the Court,
this conflict is particularly severe with respect to judges ad hoc-who have been appointed by
their home government specifically with a mind to their likely stand in a single case.
168. See e.g., id. at 122 ("[The judge ad hoc] has been chosen by his countrymen because
they believe that he also shares their values and norms. At the same time he is a lawyer and
should share values and norms with the permanent members of the ICY-bench. He must fulfil
the same conditions as the other judges (Article 31(6) [of the Statute of the Court]).").
169. See supra note 162.
170. League of Nations Doc. V.1920.2, at 710 (1920).
171. Virally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 116, 143-48 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968), quoted in HENKIN, supra note 78, at 90.
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Barak's model of discretion and the doctrinal synthesis of general
principles law under Article 38(1)(c).
IV. CONCLUSION
The ICJ's approach to exercises of judicial discretion in adjudicat-
ing "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
provides some assistance in meeting the four principal challenges
posed by Justice Barak. First, while the Court's structure itself does
little to alleviate the general difficulties of self-awareness, the
doctrinal synthesis of general principles law expressly reminds judges
to resist allowing their personal values to interfere with their public
judgment. It urges judges to check their assessments of the generality
of a candidate norm against its likely acceptance by major systems of
municipal law. As with Barak's own prescriptions, this is not an
answer to the problem of transcending one's self However, the
explicit reminders of general principles doctrine may have some value
simply in their exhortation. Judges, at the least, will be aware of the
nature of the project upon which they embark: this cannot but
improve the quality of the decision-making which results. Nor, it
should be added, does discretionary general principles adjudication
require complete objectivity by an international judge. In the ICJ's
context, Article 9 and the structure of the bench make it clear that
advocacy of one's own legal system's values is indeed permissible; it
is even encouraged. Whatever legal subculture from which he may
have come, this is a luxury denied to the domestic jurist.
The Court's approach to general principles doctrine has little to
say, however, about the second principal challenge facing Barak's
jurist: that of distinguishing hard cases from others. International law,
as we have seen, has quite a thin body of caselaw and fairly attenuat-
ed principles of stare decisis and preclusion. If non liquet is indeed
prohibited, one might assume that genuinely hard cases would come
up with greater relative frequency than they do in domestic litiga-
tion."' This second challenge is poorly addressed by general
principles doctrine, and is perhaps unanswerable: hard cases are
probably, at best, visible only upon actual encounter.
172. At the same time, however, the ICJ relies upon party consent to bring litigants before
the bar, and hears very few cases even in its most active of years. The actual number of hard
cases may thus be small indeed-to which the present paucity of existing general principles
decisions may attest.
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The Court's constituency-representative structure and the
doctrinal general principles synthesis, however, do provide a partial
answer to our third challenge: that of discerning the values of the
relevant legal community. To the extent that international judges
(and the Court) retain a broad responsibility for administering the
values of the international community as a whole, they will still face
great difficulties in divining these values. To the extent, however, that
general principles inquiries can be answered through the
quasi-comparativist methodology of the doctrinal synthesis, the
relevant legal community to which a judge must look is subdivided
into rather more manageable parts. It is no easier a task than that
faced by domestic jurists-indeed, the phrasing of Article 9 suggests
that judges' value-constituencies are unlikely to be any smaller than
an individual territorial state, and may well be much larger-but the
structure of the Court lightens some of the burdens facing the
international bench.
The fourth challenge facing a Barakian jurist, that of discerning
guiding values from a legal community, however identified, that itself
possesses internal value-subcommunities, still bedevils international
judges both at the "micro" and at the "macro" levels. They must
determine the fundamental conceptions of their home constituencies,
and then must decide whether the international legal order itself
contains guiding values applicable to the case at hand. The Court's
structure and the doctrinal synthesis provide no easy approach to this
difficulty except, again, to encourage maximal judicial awareness of
the challenges of the judicial process.
The problems faced by the international bench are in may ways
more extreme than those faced by domestic jurists. International law
lacks a foundational text of the sort that supports domestic
constitutionalism. It expressly authorizes judges to look to the values
of "civilized nations" in adjudicating "general principles." Thus,
international law, under Article 38(1)(c), remains fundamentally
wedded to the responsivist paradigm, and with it to the willful
exercise of judicial discretion on Barak's model. The
constituency-representative structure of the ICJ itself moreover, is
well suited to the exercise of responsivist discretion and powerfully
complements quasi-comparativist articulations of general principles
doctrine. These complementary approaches do not solve the
problems faced by the ICJ in exercising judicial discretion. They
point the way, however, to as manageable a methodology as one
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might reasonably hope to achieve, and may provide a model for
discretionary exercises in other areas of international jurisprudence.
